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Abstract
We develop a framework to leverage the elegant “worst average-case” idea in
smoothed complexity analysis to social choice, motivated by modern applications
of social choice powered by AI and ML. Using our framework, we characterize
the smoothed likelihood of some fundamental paradoxes and impossibility theo-
rems as the number of agents increases. For Condrocet’s paradox, we prove that
the smoothed likelihood of the paradox either vanishes at an exponential rate, or
does not vanish at all. For the folklore impossibility on the non-existence of vot-
ing rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality, we characterize the rate for the
impossibility to vanish, to be either polynomially fast or exponentially fast. We
also propose a novel easy-to-compute tie-breaking mechanism that optimally pre-
serves anonymity and neutrality for even number of alternatives in natural settings.
Our results illustrate the smoothed possibility of social choice—even though the
paradox and the impossibility theorem hold in the worst case, they may not be a
big concern in practice in certain natural settings.
1 Introduction
Dealing with paradoxes and impossibility theorems is a major challenge in social choice theory,
because “the force and widespread presence of impossibility results generated a consolidated sense
of pessimism, and this became a dominant theme in welfare economics and social choice theory in
general”, as the eminent economist Amartya Sen commented in his Nobel prize lecture [45].
Many paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice are based on worst-case analysis. Take
perhaps the earliest impossibility theorem, Condorcet’s (voting) paradox [11], for example. Con-
dorcet’s paradox states that, when there are at least three alternatives, it is impossible for pairwise
majority aggregation to be transitive. The proof is done by explicitly constructing a worst-case
scenario—a profile P that contains a Condorcet cycle. For example, in P = {a  b  c, b  c 
a, c  a  b}, there is a cycle a  b, b  c, and c  a of pairwise majority. Condorcet’s paradox
is closely related to the celebrated Arrow’s impossibility theorem: if Condorcet’s paradox can be
avoided, then the pairwise majority rule can avoid Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
As another example, a folklore impossibility theorem states that no single-winner voting rule r can
satisfy both anonymity (r is insensitive to the identities of agents) and neutrality (r is insensitive to
the identities of alternatives). The proof is done by analyzing a worst-case scenario P = {a  b, b 
a}. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that r satisfies both anonymity and neutrality. Without
loss of generality, suppose r(P ) = a. After exchanging a and b, the winner should be b according
to neutrality. But since the permuted profile still contains one vote for a  b and one vote for b  a,
the winner should be a according to anonymity, which is a contradiction.
There is an enormous literature in social choice on circumventing the impossibilities, most of
which belongs to the following two approaches. (1) Domain restrictions, namely, agents’ reported
preferences are assumed to come from a subset of all linear orders such as single-peaked prefer-
ences [5, 2, 46, 38, 12, 6, 17]; and (2) likelihood analysis, where impossibility theorems are eval-
uated by the likelihood of their occurrence in profiles randomly generated from a distribution such
as the i.i.d. uniform distribution, a.k.a. Impartial Culture (IC) [21, 24]. Both approaches have been
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criticized for making strong and unrealistic assumptions on the domain and on the probability dis-
tributions, respectively. In particular, IC has received much criticism, see e.g. [14], yet no widely-
accepted probabilisitic model exists to the best of our knowledge.
The worst-case nature of the impossibility theorems might be desirable for high-stakes, less-frequent
applications such as political elections, but its practical relevance is questionable, especially in the
AI era, where AI systems can assist in group decision-making, for example by learning agents’
preferences [50]. AI-powered social choice could be a promising solution to the turnout problem,
which is one of the major problems social choice theory faces, as pointed out by Sen [45]. Such AI
systems can promote democracy on a larger scale and with a higher frequency. Additionally, despite
the mathematical impossibilities, a social choice has to be made in many cases, so a more practical
and discriminative—ideally quantitative—measure beyond worst-case analysis is desirable. This
motivates us to ask the following key question:
How can we measure the practical relevance of paradoxes and impossibility theorems in large-
scale frequently-used applications of social choice?
The large-scale feature naturally leads to the analysis of asymptotic occurrence of the impossibility
theorems, and the frequently-used feature naturally leads to the analysis of average likelihood of the
impossibility theorems. But in light of the criticism of the classical likelihood analysis approach
discussed above, what is a realistic model to answer the key question?
Interestingly, computer science has encountered a similar challenge and has gone through a similar
way in the analysis of practical performance of algorithms. Initially, the analysis mostly focused
on the worst case, as in the spirit of big O notation and NP-hardness. Domain restrictions have
been a popular approach beyond the worst-case analysis. For example, while SAT is NP-hard, its
restriction 2-SAT is in P. Likelihood analysis, in particular average-case analysis, has also been a
popular approach, yet it suffers from the same criticism as its counterpart in social choice—the
distribution used in the analysis may well be unrealistic [48].
The challenge was addressed by the smoothed (complexity) analysis introduced by Spielman and
Teng [47], which focuses on the “worst average-case” scenario that combines the worst-case analysis
and the average-case analysis. The idea is based on the fact that the input ~x of an algorithm is often
a noisy perception of the ground truth ~x∗. Therefore, the worst-case is analyzed by assuming that
an adversary chooses a ground truth ~x∗ and then Nature adds a noise ~ (e.g. a Gaussian noise) to
it, such that the algorithm’s input becomes ~x = ~x∗ + ~. The smoothed runtime of an algorithm is
therefore max~x∗ E~ RunTime(~x∗ + ~), in contrast to the worst-case runtime max~x∗ RunTime(~x∗)
and the average-case runtime E~x∗∼piRunTime(~x∗), where pi is a given distribution over data.
Our Contributions. We are not aware of a previous work on smoothed analysis in classical social
choice, and our conceptual contribution is a framework that leverages the elegant idea of smoothed
complexity analysis to answer the key question above. In social choice, the data is a profile, which
consists of agents’ reported preferences that are often represented by linear orders over a setA of m
alternatives. Like in the smoothed complexity analysis, in our framework there is an adversary who
controls agents’ “ground truth” preferences, which may be ordinal (as rankings over alternatives) or
cardinal (as utilities over alternatives). Then, Nature adds a “noise” to the ground truth preferences
and outputs a preferences profile, which consists of linear orders over alternatives.
We use a statistical model to model Nature’s noising procedure for each agent. As in many
smoothed-analysis approaches, we assume that noises are independently generated, yet agents’
ground truth preferences can be arbitrarily correlated, which constitutes the basis for the worst-case
analysis. Using our smoothed analysis framework, we obtain dichotomy theorems on the asymp-
totic smoothed likelihood of Condorcet’s paradox and the folklore impossibility theorem under mild
assumptions, when the number of alternativesm is fixed and the number of agents n goes to infinity.
THEOREM 1. (Smoothed Condorcet’s paradox, informally put). The smoothed likelihood of
Condorcet’s Paradox either vanishes at an exponential rate, or does not vanish at all.
THEOREM 2. (Smoothed folklore (im)possibility theorem, informally put). The theorem has
two parts. The smoothed possibility part states that there exist voting rules under which the im-
possibility theorem either vanishes at an exponential rate or at a polynomial rate. The smoothed
impossibility part states that there does not exists a voting rule under which the impossibility theo-
rem vanishes faster than under the rules in the smoothed possibility part.
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Both theorems are quite general and their formal statements also characterize conditions for each
case. Such conditions in Theorem 1 will tell us when Condorcet’s Paradox vanishs (at an exponential
rate), which is positive. The smoothed possibility part of Theorem 2 is positive too, because it states
that the folklore impossibility theorem vanishes as the number of agents n increases. The smoothed
impossibility part of Theorem 2 is mildly negative, because it states that no voting rule can do
better, though the impossibility may still vanish as n increases. Together, our results illustrate the
smoothed possibility of social choice—even though the paradox and the impossibility theorem hold
in the worst case, they may not be a big concern in practice in some natural settings.
Our framework also allows us to develop a novel easy-to-compute tie-breaking mechanism called
most popular singleton ranking (MPSR) tie-breaking, which tries to break ties using a linear order
that uniquely occurs most often in the profile (Definition 8). We prove that MPSR can significantly
reduce the smoothed likelihood of the folklore impossibility theorem with the commonly-used lex-
icographic tie-breaking and fixed-agent tie-breaking, from n−0.5 to n−
m!
4 , for many commonly-
studied voting rules under natural assumptions (Proposition 1 and Theorem 3), and is optimal for all
even number of alternatives m (Theorem 2 and Lemma 2).
Proof Techniques. Standard approximation techniques such as Berry-Esseen theorem and its high-
dimensional counterparts Lypanov-type of results, due to their O(n−0.5) error terms, are too coarse
for the (tight) bound in Theorem 2. To prove our theorems, we first model various events of in-
terest as systems of linear constraints. Then, we develop a technical tool (Lemma 1) to provide
a dichotomy characterization for the histogram of a randomly generated profile to satisfy the con-
straints, which might be of independent interest. We further show in Appendix 14 that Lemma 1 is a
powerful tool for analyzing smoothed likelihood of many other commonly-studied events in social
choice (Table 4), which are otherwise hard to analyze. The smoothed (avoidance of) paradoxes and
(im)possibility theorem, and the technical lemma are our technical contributions.
Related Work and Discussions. Smoothed analysis has been applied to a wide range of problems
in mathematical programming, machine learning, numerical analysis, discrete math, combinatorial
optimization, and equilibrium analysis and price of anarchy [10], see [48] for a survey. In a recent
blue-sky paper, Baumeister et al. [4] proposed to conduct smoothed complexity analysis in compu-
tational aspects of social choice.
In our model, agents’ ground truth preferences can be arbitrarily correlated, and the randomness
comes from independent noises. This is a standard assumption in smoothed complexity analysis as
well as in the literature in psychology, economics, and behavioral science, such as in random utility
models, logistic regression, etc. As another justification, the adversary can be seen as a manipulator
who wants to affect agents’ reported preferences, but is only able to do it in a probabilistic way.
Our framework leverages the worst average-case idea in smoothed complexity analysis but is tech-
nically different in two aspects. First, the noising procedure is different. Our framework uses a
statistical model to capture the noising procedure for each agent, while smoothed complexity analy-
sis often assumes that a noise is directly added to the ground truth. Second, our results characterize
asymptotic smoothed likelihood of events, while smoothed complexity analysis focuses on studying
the relationship between the noise level and the smoothed runtime of an algorithm. In our frame-
work the asymptotic anonymized profile can be viewed as the ground truth plus an Gaussian-like
noise as in smoothed complexity analysis, but this viewpoint does not allow us to accurately analyze
the smoothed likelihood of events due to the coarse O(n−0.5) error in Gaussian approximations.
Our technical results are quite general and can be easily applied to classical likelihood analysis in
social choice under i.i.d. distribution, to answer open questions, obtain new results, and provide new
insights. For example, a straightforward application of Lemma 1 gives an asymptotic answer to
an open question by Tsetlin et al. [49] (see the discussion after Corollary 2 in Appendix 14). As
another example, we are not aware of a previous work that characterizes asymptotic likelihood of
the folklore impossibility theorem even under IC, which is a special case of Theorem 2. We also
show in Appendix 10.1 that our proof techniques for Theorem 2 can be used to provide an alternative
proof for an elegant characterization for the folklore impossibility theorem to hold [39, Problem 1].
As discussed above, there is a large literature on domain restrictions and the likelihood analysis
toward circumventing impossibility theorems, see, for example, the book by Gehrlein and Lepel-
ley [23] for a recent survey. In particular, there is a large literature on the likelihood of Condorcet
voting paradox and the likelihood of (non)-existence of Condorcet winner under i.i.d. distributions
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especially IC [15, 33, 22, 49, 27, 24, 8, 9]. The IC assumption has also been used to prove quan-
titative versions of other impossibility theorems in social choice such as Arrow’s impossibility the-
orem [28, 29, 36] and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [19, 37], as well as in judgement aggrega-
tion [40, 18]. Other works have studied social choice problems when each agent’s preferences are
represented by a probability distribution [3, 25, 43, 51, 41, 31]. These works have focused on de-
signing efficient algorithms for computing the outcome, which is quite different from our goal. Our
smoothed analysis framework is also related to the line of research on distortion in social choice,
which aims at characterizing the loss of social welfare due to the inefficiency in communicating
agents’ preferences to the center [42, 1, 32, 30]. Again, the goal there is quite different from ours.
2 Preliminaries
Basic Setting. Let A = [m] = {1, . . . ,m} denote the set of m ≥ 3 alternatives. Let L(A) denote
the set of all linear orders (a.k.a. rankings) over A. Let n ∈ N denote the number of agents. Each
agent uses a linear order to represent his or her preferences. The vector of n ∈ N agents’ votes P
is called a (preference) profile, or sometimes an n-profile. For any profile P , let Hist(P ) ∈ Zm!≥0
denote the anonymized profile of P , sometimes also called the histogram of P , which counts the
number of each linear order in P . A voting rule r is a mapping from each profile to a single winner
in A. A voting correspondence c is a mapping from each profile to a non-empty set of co-winners.
Tie-breaking Mechanisms. Many commonly-studied voting rules are defined as correspondences
combined with a tie-breaking mechanism. For example, a positional scoring correspondence is
characterized by a scoring vector ~s = (s1, . . . , sm) with s1 ≥ s2 ≥ · · · ≥ sm and s1 > sm. For
any alternative a and any linear order R ∈ L(A), we let ~s(R, a) = si, where i is the rank of a
in R. Given a profile P , the positional scoring correspondence c~s chooses all alternatives a with
maximum
∑
R∈P ~s(R, a). For example, Plurality uses the scoring vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) and Borda
uses the scoring vector (m − 1,m − 2, . . . , 0). The positional scoring rule r~s chooses a single
alternative by further applying a tie-breaking mechanism. The lexicographic tie-breaking, denoted
by LEX-R where R ∈ L(A), breaks ties in favor of alternatives ranked higher in R. The fixed-agent
tie-breaking, denoted by FA-j where 1 ≤ j ≤ n, uses agent j’s preferences to break ties.
(Un)weighted Majority Graphs. For any profile P and any pair of alternatives a, b, let P [a  b]
denote the number of rankings in P where a is preferred to b. Let WMG(P ) denote the weighted
majority graph of P , where the vertices are A and the edge weights are wP (a, b) = P [a  b] −
P [b  a]. For any distribution pi over L(A), let WMG(pi) denote the weighted majority graph
where pi is treated as a fractional profile, where for each R ∈ L(A) there are pi(R) copies of R.
The unweighted majority graph (UMG) of a profile P , denoted by UMG(P ), is the unweighted
directed graph where the vertices are the alternatives and there is an edge a → b if and only if
P [a  b] > P [b  a]. If a and b are tied, then there is no edge between a and b. UMG(pi) is defined
similarly. A Condorcet cycle of a profile P is a cycle in UMG(P ). A weak Condorcet cycle of a
profile P is a cycle in a supergraph of UMG(P ).
Axiomatic Properties. A voting rule r satisfies anonymity, if the winner is insensitive to the identity
of the voters. That is, for any pair of profiles P and P ′ with Hist(P ) = Hist(P ′), we have r(P ) =
r(P ′). r satisfies neutrality if the winner is insensitive to the identity of the alternatives. That is, for
any permutation σ over A, we have r(σ(P )) = σ(r(P )).
Single-Agent Preference Models. A statistical modelM = (Θ,S,Π) has three components: the
parameter space Θ, which contains the “ground truth”; the sample space S, which contains all
possible data; and the set of probability distributions Π, which contains a distribution pi~θ over S for
each ~θ ∈ Θ. In this paper we use single-agent preference models, where S = L(A).
Definition 1. A single-agent preference model is denoted by M = (Θ,L(A),Π). M is strictly
positive if there exists d > 0 such that the probability of any ranking under any distribution in Π is
greater than d.M is closed if Π is a closed set.M is neutral if for any θ ∈ Θ and any permutation
σ over A, there exists η ∈ Θ such that for all V ∈ L(A), we have piθ(V ) = piη(σ(V )).
For example, in a single-agent Mallows’ modelMMa, Θ = L(A) × [0, 1], where in each (R,ϕ) ∈
Θ, R is the central ranking and ϕ is the dispersion parameter. For any W ∈ L(A), we have
pi(R,ϕ) = ϕ
KT(R,W )/Zϕ, where KT(R,W ) is the Kendall Tau distance between R and W , namely
the number of pairwise disagreements between R and W , and Zϕ =
∑
W∈L(A) ϕ
KT(R,W ) is the
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normalization constant. For any 0 <  ≤ 1, we let M[,1]Ma denote the Mallows’ model where the
parameter space is L(A)× [, 1]. As another example, in the single-agent Plackett-Luce modelMPl,
Θ = {~θ ∈ [0, 1]m : ~θ · ~1 = 1}. For any ~θ ∈ Θ and any R = σ(1)  σ(2)  · · ·  σ(m), we
have pi~θ(R) =
∏m−1
i=1
θσ(i)∑m
l=i θσ(l)
. For any 0 <  ≤ 1, we letM[,1]Pl denote the Plackett-Luce model
where Θ = {~θ ∈ [, 1]m : ~θ · ~1 = 1}. It follows that for any 0 <  ≤ 1, M[,1]Ma and M[,1]Pl are
strictly positive, closed, and neutral.
3 Smoothed Analysis Framework and The Main Technical Lemma
Many commonly-studied axioms and events in social choice, denoted by X , are defined in the
following way. Let r denote a voting rule or correspondence and let P denote a profile. There
is a function SX(r, P ) ∈ {0, 1} that indicates whether X holds for r at P . Then, r satisfies
X if ∀P,SX(r, P ) = 1, or equivalently, minP SX(r, P ) = 1. For example, for anonymity, let
Sano(r, P ) = 1 iff for all profiles P ′ with Hist(P ′) = Hist(P ), we have r(P ′) = r(P ). For neu-
trality, let Sneu(r, P ) = 1 iff for all permutation σ over A, we have σ(r(P )) = r(σ(P )). For
non-existence of Condorcet cycle, let SNCC(P ) = 1 iff there is no Condorcet cycle in P .
Our smoothed analysis framework assumes that each of the n agents’ preferences are chosen from a
single-agent preference modelM = (Θ,L(A),Π) by the adversary.
Definition 2 (Smoothed likelihood of events). Given a single-agent preference model M =
(Θ,L(A),Π), n ∈ N agents, a function SX that characterizes an axiom or event X , and a voting
rule (or correspondence) r, the smoothed likelihood of X is defined as min~pi∈Πn EP∼pi~piSX(r, P ).
For example, min~pi∈Πn EP∼pi~piSNCC(P ) is the smoothed likelihood of non-existence of Condorcet
cycle, which corresponds to the avoidance of Condorcet’s paradox. min~pi∈Πn PrP∼pi~pi (Sano(P ) +
Sneu(P ) = 2) is the smoothed likelihood of satisfaction of anonymity+neutrality, which corresponds
to the avoidance of the folklore impossibility theorem.
We use the following simple example to show how to model events of interest as a system of linear
constraints. The first event is closely related to the smoothed Condorcet’s paradox (Theorem 1) and
the second event is closely related to the smoothed folklore theorem (Theorem 2).
Example 1. Let m = 3 and A = {1, 2, 3}. For any profile P , let x123 denote the number of
1  2  3 in P . The event “there is a Cordorcet cycle 1→ 2→ 3→ 1” can be represented by:
x123 + x132 + x312 − (x213 + x231 + x321) > 0 (1)
x231 + x213 + x123 − (x312 + x321 + x132) > 0 (2)
x312 + x321 + x231 − (x123 + x132 + x213) > 0 (3)
Equation (1) (respectively, (2) and (3)) states that UMG(P ) has edge 1 → 2 (respectively, 2 → 3
and 3 → 1). As another example, the event “Hist(P ) is invariant to the permutation σ over A that
exchanges 1 and 2” can be represented by {x123 − x213 = 0, x132 − x231 = 0, x312 − x321 = 0}.
Notice that in this example each constraint has the form ~a · ~x = 0 or ~b · ~x > 0, where ~a · ~1 = 0
and~b ·~1 = 0. More generally, our main technical lemma upper-bounds the smoothed likelihood for
Hist(P ) to satisfy a similar system of linear inequalities defined below.
Definition 3. Let q, n ∈ N. For any vector of n distributions ~pi = (pi1, . . . , pin), each of which is
over [q], let ~Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) denote the vector of n random variables distributed as pi1, . . . , pin,
respectively, and let ~X~pi = Hist(~Y ), which is a q-dimensional random vector counting the numbers
of occurrence of each i ≤ q in ~Y .
Definition 4. Let CAB(~x) = {A · (~x)> = (~0)> and B · (~x)> > (~0)>}, where A is a K × q
integer matrix and B is an L × q integer matrix with K + L ≥ 1. Let CAB(~x) = {A · (~x)> =
(~0)> and B · (~x)> ≥ (~0)>} denote the relaxation of CAB(~x). Let SolAB and SolAB denote the
solutions to CAB(~x) and CAB(~x), respectively.
Lemma 1 (Main technical lemma). Let q ∈ N and let Π be a closed set of strictly positive distri-
butions over [q]. Let CH(Π) denote the convex hull of Π.
Upper bound. For any n ∈ N and any ~pi ∈ Πn,
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Pr
(
~X~pi ∈ SolAB
)
=

0 if SolAB = ∅
exp(−Ω(n)) if SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB ∩ CH(Π) = ∅
O(n−
Rank(A)
2 ) if SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB ∩ CH(Π) 6= ∅
Tightness of the upper bound. There exists a constant C such that for any n′ ∈ N, there exists
n′ ≤ n ≤ Cn′ and ~pi ∈ Πn such that
Pr
(
~X~pi ∈ SolAB
)
=
{
exp(−O(n)) if SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB ∩ CH(Π) = ∅
Ω(n−
Rank(A)
2 ) if SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB ∩ CH(Π) 6= ∅
Lemma 1 is quite general, as the assumptions on Π are mild, and A and B are general enough to
model a wide range of events in social choice as we will see later in the paper. The theorem provides
asymptotically tight upper bounds on the probability for the histogram of a randomly generated
profile from ~pi ∈ Πn to satisfy all constraints in CAB. The bounds provide a trichotomy: if no
vector satisfies all constraints in CAB, i.e. SolAB = ∅, then the upper bound is 0; otherwise if
SolAB 6= ∅ and its relaxation SolAB does not contain a vector in the convex hull of Π, then the
upper bound is exponentially small; otherwise the upper bound is polynomially small in n, and the
degree of polynomial is determined by the rank of A, namely −Rank(A)2 . The tightness part of the
theorem states that the upper bounds cannot be improved for all n.
At a high level the theorem is quite natural and follows the intuition of multivariate central limit
theorem as follows. Roughly, ~X~pi is distributed around ~pi ·~1 (which is a q-dimensional vector) like a
multinomial-Gaussian. Then, the zero part of Lemma 1 is trivial; the exponential part makes sense
because the center ~pi · ~1 is Θ(n) away from any vector in SolAB; and the last part is expected to be
O(n−0.5) because the center ~pi ·~1 satisfies the A part of CAB.
The surprising part of the theorem is the degree of polynomial−Rank(A)2 and its tightness. All central
limit theorems we are aware of, in particular Berry-Esseen theorem and its multidimensional coun-
terparts Lyapunov-type bounds, contain an O(n−0.5) error term, which is often much more coarse
thanO(n−
Rank(A)
2 ). To prove the polynomial upper bound, we introduce an alternative representation
of ~X~pi to tackle the dependencies among its components, prove novel fine-grained concentration and
anti-concentration bounds, focus on the reduced echelon form of A plus an additional constraint on
the total number of agents to characterize SolAB, and then do a weighted counting of vectors that
satisfy CAB. The full proof can be found in Appendix 7.
4 Smoothed Likelihood of Condorcet’s Paradox and Smoothed Folklore
(Im)possibility Theorem
We first apply the main technical lemma (Lemma 1) to characterize the smoothed likelihood of
Condorcet’s paradox in the following dichotomy theorem.
Theorem 1 (Smoothed likelihood of Codorcet’s paradox). LetM = (Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly
positive and closed single-agent preference model.
Smoothed avoidance of Condorcet’s paradox. Suppose for all pi ∈ CH(Π), UMG(pi) does not
contain a weak Condorcet cycle. Then, for any n ∈ N, we have:
min~pi∈Πn EP∼~piSNCC(P ) = 1− exp(−Ω(n))
Smoothed Condorcet’s paradox. Suppose there exists pi ∈ CH(Π) such that UMG(pi) contains a
weak Condorcet cycle. Then, there exist infinitely many n ∈ N such that:
min~pi∈Πn EP∼~piSNCC(P ) = 1− Ω(1)
The first part of the theorem (smoothed avoidance) is positive news: if there is no weak Condorcet
cycle in the UMG of any distribution in the convex hull of Π, then no matter how the adversary
sets agents’ ground truth preferences, the probability for Condorcet’s paradox to hold, which is
1 − min~pi∈Πn EP∼~piSNCC(P ) = max~pi∈Πn PrP∼~pi(SNCC(P ) = 0), vanishes at an exponential rate
as n → ∞. The second part (smoothed paradox) states that otherwise the adversary can make
Condorcet’s paradox occur with constant probability. The proof is done by modeling SNCC(P ) = 0
as systems of linear constraints as in Definition 4, each of which represents a target UMG with a
weak Codorcet cycle as in Example 1, then applying Lemma 1. The full proof is in Appendix 8.
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We now turn to the smoothed folklore impossibility theorem. We will reveal a relationship between
all n-profiles and all permutation groups over A after recalling some basic notions in group theory.
The symmetric group over A = [m], denoted by SA, is the set of all permutations over A. A
permutation group G is a subgroup of SA where the identity element is denoted by Id, and for any
σ, η ∈ SA, σ ◦ η is the permutation such that for any R ∈ L(A), (σ ◦ η)(R) = σ(η(R)).
Definition 5. For any profile P , let Perm(P ) denote the set of all permutations σ over A that maps
Hist(P ) to itself. Formally, Perm(P ) = {σ ∈ SA : Hist(P ) = σ(Hist(P ))}.
See Appendix 9 for additional notation and examples about group theory. It is not hard to see that
Perm(P ) is a permutation group. We now define a special type of permutation groups that “cover”
all alternatives in A, which are closely related to the impossibility theorem.
Definition 6. For any permutation group U ⊆ SA and any alternative a ∈ A, we say that U covers
a if there exists σ ∈ U such that a 6= σ(a). We say that U covers A if it covers all alternatives in A.
For any m, let Um denote the set of all permutation groups that cover A.
For example, when m = 3, U3 contains only one permutation group {Id, (1, 2, 3), (1, 3, 2)}, where
(1, 2, 3) is the circular permutation 1 → 2 → 3 → 1. See Example 4 in Appendix 9 for the list of
all permutation groups for m = 3. In general |Um| > 1.
Theorem 2 (Smoothed folklore (im)possibility theorem). Let M = (Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly
positive and closed single-agent preference model. Let UΠm = {U ∈ Um : ∃pi ∈ CH(Π),∀σ ∈
U, σ(pi) = pi}, and when UΠm 6= ∅, let lmin = minU∈UΠm |U | and lΠ = lmin−1lmin m!.
Smoothed possibility. There exist an anonymous voting rule rano and a neutral voting rule rneu such
that for any r ∈ {rano, rneu}, any n, and any ~pi ∈ Πn, we have:
PrP∼~pi(Sano(r, P ) + Sneu(r, P ) < 2) =
{
O(n−
lΠ
2 ) if UΠm 6= ∅
exp(−Ω(n)) otherwise
Smoothed impossibility. For any voting rule r, there exist infinitely many n ∈ N such that:
max~pi∈Πn PrP∼~pi(Sano(r, P ) + Sneu(r, P ) < 2) =
{
Ω(n−
lΠ
2 ) if UΠm 6= ∅
exp(−O(n)) otherwise
We note that for any profile P , Sano(r, P ) + Sneu(r, P ) < 2 if and only if at least one of anonymity
or neutrality is violated at P . In other words, if Sano(r, P )+Sneu(r, P ) = 2 then both anonymity and
neutrality are satisfied at P . Therefore, the first part of Theorem 2 is called “smoothed possibility”
because it states that no matter how the adversary sets agents’ ground truth preferences, the proba-
bility for rano (respectively, rneu) to satisfy both anonymity and neutrality converges to 1. The second
part (smoothed impossibility) shows that the rate of convergence in the first part is asymptotically
tight for all n. This is a mild impossibility theorem because violations of anonymity or neutrality
may still vanish (at a slower rate) as n→∞.
The proof proceeds in the following three steps. Step 1. For any m and n, we define a set of profiles,
denoted by Tm,n, that represent the source of impossibility. In fact, Tm,n is the set of all n-profiles
P such that Perm(P ) covers A, i.e. Perm(P ) ∈ Um. Step 2. To prove the smoothed possibility
part, we define rano and rneu that satisfy both anonymity and neutrality for all profiles that are not
in Tm,n. Then, we apply Lemma 1 to upper-bound the probability of Tm,n. Step 3. The smoothed
impossibility part is proved by applying the tightness part of Lemma 1 to the probability of Tm,n.
The full proof can be found in Appendix 10.
In general lmin in Theorem 2 can be hard to characterize. The following lemma provides a lower
bound on lmin by characterizing minU∈Um |U |, whose group-theoretic proof is in Appendix 11.
Lemma 2. For any m ≥ 2, let l∗ = minU∈Um |U |. We have l∗ = 2 if m is even; l∗ = 3 if m is odd
and 3 | m; l∗ = 5 if m is odd, 3 - m, and 5 | m; and l∗ = 6 for other m.
We note that both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 are quite general as they require mild assumptions on
Π. A notable special case of Theorem 2 is piuni ∈ CH(Π), where piuni is the uniform distribution over
L(A). We note that for any permutation σ, piuni = σ(piuni), which means that UΠm = Um. Therefore,
only the polynomial bound in Theorem 2 remains, with lΠ = l
∗−1
l∗ m!. In particular, piuni ∈ CH(Π)
for all neutral single-agent preference models, such as M[,1]Ma , M[,1]Pl where 0 <  ≤ 1, and IC,
which corresponds to Π = {piuni}. See Corollary 1 in Appendix 11.1 for the formal statement.
7
5 Optimal Tie-Breaking for Anonymity + Neutrality
While rano and rneu in Theorem 2 are asymptotically optimal w.r.t. anonymity + neutrality, they
may be hard to compute. The following proposition shows that the commonly-used LEX and FA
mechanisms are far from being optimal for positional scoring rules.
Proposition 1. Let r be a voting rule obtained from a positional scoring correspondence by applying
LEX or FA. LetM = (Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly positive and closed single-agent preference model
where piuni ∈ CH(Π). There exist infinitely many n ∈ N such that:
max~pi∈Πn PrP∼~pi (Sano(r, P ) + Sneu(r, P ) < 2) = Ω(n−0.5)
The proof is done by modeling ties under positional scoring correspondences as systems of linear
constraints, then applying the tightness of the polynomial bound in Lemma 1. The full proof can be
found in Appendix 12. We now introduce a new class of easy-to-compute tie-breaking mechanisms
that achieve the optimal upper bound O(n−
m!
4 ) in Theorem 2 when m is even.
Definition 7 (Most popular singleton ranking). Given a profile P , we define its most popular
singleton ranking (MPSR) as MPSR(P ) = arg maxR(P [R] : @W 6= R s.t. P [W ] = P [R]).
Put differently, a ramking R is called a singleton in a profile P , if there does not exist another linear
order that occurs for the same number of times in P . MPSR(P ) is the singleton ranking that occurs
most frequently in P . If no singleton exists, then we let MPSR(P ) = ∅. We now define tie-breaking
mechanisms based on MPSR.
Definition 8 (MPSR tie-breaking mechanism). For any voting correspondence c, any profile P ,
and any backup tie-breaking mechanism TB, the MPSR-then-TB mechanism uses MPSR(P ) to
break ties whenever MPSR(P ) 6= ∅; otherwise it uses TB to break ties.
Theorem 3. LetM = (Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly positive and closed single-agent preference model,
where piuni ∈ CH(Π). For any voting correspondence c that satisfies anonymity and neutrality, let
rMPSR denote the voting rule obtained from c by MPSR-then-TB. For any n and any ~pi ∈ Πn,
PrP∼~pi(Sano(rMPSR, P ) + Sneu(rMPSR, P ) < 2) = O(n−
m!
4 )
Moreover, if TB satisfies anonymity (respectively, neutrality) then so does rMPSR.
The proof is done by showing that (1) anonymity and neutrality are preserved when MPSR(P ) 6= ∅,
and (2) any profile P with MPSR(P ) = ∅ can be represented by a system of linear constraints,
whose smoothed likelihood is upper-bounded by the polynomial upper bound in Lemma 1. The full
proof can be found in Appendix 13.
Note that when m is even, the O(n−
m!
4 ) upper bound in Theorem 3 matches the optimal up-
per bound in light of Theorem 2 and Lemma 2. This is good news because it implies that
any anonymous and neutral correspondence can be made an asymptotically optimal voting rule
w.r.t. anonymity+neutrality by MPSR tie-breaking. When m is odd, the O(n−
m!
4 ) upper bound
in Theorem 3 is suboptimal but still significantly better than that of the popular lexicographic or
fixed-agent tie-breaking mechanisms, which is Ω(n−0.5) (Proposition 1).
Future work. We have only touched the tip of the iceberg of smoothed analysis in social choice.
There are at least three major dimensions for future work: (1) other social choice axioms and im-
possibility theorems, for example Arrow’s impossibility theorem [28, 29, 36] and the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem [19, 37], (2) computational aspects in social choice [7, 4] such as the
smoothed complexity of winner determination and complexity of manipulation, and (3) other so-
cial choice settings such as judgement aggregation [40, 18], matching, resource allocation, etc.
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7 Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. (Main technical lemma). Let q ∈ N and Π be a closed set of strictly positive distribu-
tions over [q]. Let CH(Π) denote the convex hull of Π.
Upper bound. For any n ∈ N and any ~pi ∈ Πn,
Pr
(
~X~pi ∈ SolAB
)
=

0 if SolAB = ∅
exp(−Ω(n)) if SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB ∩ CH(Π) = ∅
O(n−
Rank(A)
2 ) if SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB ∩ CH(Π) 6= ∅
Tightness of the upper bound. There exists a constant C such that for any n′ ∈ N, there exists
n′ ≤ n ≤ Cn′ and ~pi ∈ Πn such that
Pr
(
~X~pi ∈ SolAB
)
=
{
exp(−O(n)) if SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB ∩ CH(Π) = ∅
Ω(n−
Rank(A)
2 ) if SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB ∩ CH(Π) 6= ∅
Proof. The SolAB = ∅ case trivially holds. Let o = Rank(A). Let ~X~pi = Hist(~Y ) =
(X~pi,1 . . . , X~pi,q). That is, for any i ≤ q, X~pi,i represents the number of occurrences of outcome
i in ~Y . For any n ∈ N and any ~pi ∈ Πn, let ~µ~pi = (µ~pi,1, . . . , µ~pi,q) = E(
∑n
j=1
~X~pi/n) denote
the mean of ~X~pi/n and let ~σ~pi = (σ~pi,1, . . . , σ~pi,q), where for each i ≤ q, σ~pi,i =
√
Var(X~pi,i)/n.
Because Π is strictly positive, there exists d1 > 0, d2 > 0 such that for all n, all ~pi ∈ Πn, and all
i ≤ q, we have d1 < µ~pi,i < d2 and d1√n < σ~pi,i < d2√n .
Upper bound when SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB∩CH(Π) = ∅. It is not hard to see that SolAB is convex
and closed. Because Π is closed and bounded, CH(Π) is convex, closed and compact. Because
SolAB ∩ CH(Π) = ∅, by the strict hyperplane separation theorem, there exists a hyperplane that
strictly separates SolAB and CH(Π). Therefore, there exists ′ > 0 such that for any ~x1 ∈ SolAB
and any ~x2 ∈ CH(Π), we have |~x1 − ~x2|∞ > ′, where | · |∞ is the L∞ norm. This means that any
solution to CH(~x) is at least ′n away from n · ~µ~pi in L∞. Therefore, we have:
Pr
(
~X~pi ∈ SolAB
)
≤ Pr
(
| ~X~pi − n · ~µ~pi|∞ > ′n
)
≤
q∑
i=1
Pr(|X~pi,i − nµpi,i| > ′n)
≤ 2q exp
(
− (
′)2n
(1− 2d)2
)
The last inequality follows after Hoeffding’s inequality (Theorem 2 in [26]), where d is a constant
such that any distribution in Π is bounded above 0 by d.
Upper bound when SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB ∩ CH(Π) 6= ∅. Let CA(~x) = {A · ~x = (~0)>} denote
the relaxation of CAB(~x) by removing the B part. Let CA( ~X~pi) denote the event that ~X~pi satisfies
all constraints in CA. It follows that each vector in SolAB is a solution to CA(~x), which means
that Pr( ~X~pi ∈ SolAB) ≤ Pr(CA( ~X~pi)). Therefore, it suffices to prove that for any n ∈ N and
any ~pi ∈ Πn, Pr(CA( ~X~pi)) = O(n− o2 ). Because A · (~1)> = (~0)>, it follows that ~1 = {1}q is
linearly independent with the row vectors of A. Therefore, the rank of A′ =
[
A
~1
]
is o + 1. Let
CA′(~x) = {A · ~x = 0 and ~1 · ~x = n}. From basic linear algebra, in particular the reduced row
echelon form (a.k.a. row canonical form) [35] of A′ computed by Gauss-Jordan elimination where
n is treated as a constant, we know that there exist I0 ⊆ [q] and I1 ⊆ [q] such that I0 ∩ I1 = ∅,
|I0| = Rank(A′) = Rank(A) + 1, and an |I0| × (|I1| + 1) matrix D in Q such that CA′(~x) is
equivalent to (~xI0)
> = D · [~xI1 , n]>, where ~xI0 is the subvector of ~x that contains variables whose
subscripts are in I0. In other words, a vector ~x satisfies CA′(~x) if and only if (~xI0)
> = D · [~xI1 , n]>.
See Example 3 in Appendix 7.1 for an example of deriving D from A′.
We note that I1 ∪ I0 = [q]. For the sake of contradiction suppose this is not true, which means
that the reduced row echelon form of A′ has a column of zeros for some variable xj . However, this
means that~1 is not a linear combination of the rows of the reduced row echelon form of A′, which is
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a contradiction becauseA′, which includes~1, can be obtained from a series of linear transformations
on its reduced row echelon form. W.l.o.g. in the remainder of this proof we let I0 = {1, . . . , o+ 1}
and I1 = {o+ 2, . . . , q}.
The hardness in bounding Pr(CA( ~X~pi)) is that elements of ~X~pi are not independent, and typical
asymptotical tools such as Lyapunov-type bound are too coarse. To solve this issue, we use the
following alternative representation of Y1, . . . , Yn. For each j ≤ n, we use a binary random variable
Zj ∈ {0, 1} to represent whether the outcome of Yj is in I0 (corresponding to Zj = 0) or is in
I1 (corresponding to Zj = 1). Then, we use another random variable Wj ∈ [q] to represent the
outcome of Yj conditioned on Zj . See Figure 1 for an illustration.
Z1 Z2 Zn…
W1 W2 Wn…
!" ∈ {0,1})" ∈ [+]
Figure 1: The representation of ~Y as ~Z and ~W , where ~W has the same distribution as ~Y .
At a high level, this addresses the independent issue because components of ~W are conditionally
independent given ~Z, and as we will see below, concentration happens in ~W when ~Z contains Θ(n)
many 0’s.
Definition 9 (Alternative representation of Y1, . . . , Yn). For each j ≤ n, we define a Bayesian
network with two random variables Zj ∈ {0, 1} and Wj ∈ [q], where Zj is the parent of Wj , and
• for each l ∈ {0, 1}, Pr(Zj = l) = Pr(Yj ∈ Il);
• for each l ∈ {0, 1} and each t ≤ q, Pr(Wj = t|Zj = l) = Pr(Yj = t|Yj ∈ Il).
In particular, if t 6∈ Il then Pr(Wj = t|Zj = l) = 0.
It follows that Wj has the same distribution as Yj . For any ~z ∈ {0, 1}n, we let Ind0(~z) ⊆ [n] denote
the indices of ~z that equals to 0. Given ~z, we let ~WInd0(~z) denote the set of all Wj’s with zj = 0,
and let Hist( ~WInd0(~z)) denote the vector of o + 1 random variable that correspond to the histogram
of ~WInd0(~z). Similarly, we let Hist( ~WInd1(~z)) denote the vector of q − o − 1 random variables that
correspond to the histogram of ~WInd1(~z). Recall that each pij is bounded above 0 by d > 0. We have
the following calculation on Pr(CA( ~X~pi)), i.e. the probability that Hist(~Y ) satisfies all constraints
in CA.
Pr(CA( ~X~pi)) =
∑
~z∈{0,1}n
Pr(~Z = ~z) Pr
(
CA(Hist( ~W ))
∣∣∣ ~Z = ~z) (total probability)
=
∑
~z∈{0,1}n
Pr(~Z = ~z) Pr
(
Hist( ~WInd0(~z))
> = D · [Hist( ~WInd1(~z)), n]>
∣∣∣ ~Z = ~z)
=
∑
~z∈{0,1}n
Pr(~Z = ~z)
∑
~x∈Zq−o−1≥0
Pr
(
Hist( ~WInd1(~z)) = ~x
∣∣∣ ~Z = ~z)
× Pr
(
Hist( ~WInd0(~z))
> = D · [~x, n]>
∣∣∣ ~Z = ~z) (4)
=
∑
~z∈{0,1}n
Pr(~Z = ~z)
∑
~x∈Zq−o−1≥0
Pr
(
Hist( ~WInd1(~z)) = ~x
∣∣∣ [~Z]Ind1(~z) = ~1)
× Pr
(
Hist( ~WInd0(~z))
> = D · [~x, n]>
∣∣∣ [~Z]Ind0(~z) = ~0) (5)
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≤
∑
~z∈{0,1}n:[Hist(~z)]0≥0.9dn
Pr(~Z = ~z)
∑
~x∈Zq−o−1≥0
Pr
(
Hist( ~WInd1(~z)) = ~x
∣∣∣ [~Z]Ind1(~z) = ~1)
× Pr
(
Hist( ~WInd0(~z))
> = D · [~x, n]>
∣∣∣ [~Z]Ind0(~z) = ~0)+ Pr([Hist(~Z)]0 < 0.9dn) (6)
where [Hist(~z)]0 is the number of 0’s in ~z. (4) holds because Wj’s are independent of each other
givenZj’s, which means that for any ~z ∈ {0, 1}n, Hist( ~WInd0(~z)) and Hist( ~WInd1(~z)) are independent
given ~z. (5) holds because ~WInd1(~z) (respectively, ~WInd0(~z)) is independent of [~Z]Ind0(~z) (respectively,
[~Z]Ind1(~z)) given [~Z]Ind1(~z) (respectively, [~Z]Ind0(~z)) in light of independence in the Bayesian network.
To simplify notation, we write (6) as follows.∑
~z∈{0,1}n:[Hist(~z)]0≥0.9dn
Pr(~Z = ~z)
∑
~x∈Zq−o−1≥0
F1(~z, ~x)× F2(~z, ~x) + F3, where
F1(~z, ~x) = Pr
(
Hist( ~WInd1(~z)) = ~x
∣∣∣ [~Z]Ind1(~z) = ~1)
F2(~z, ~x) = Pr
(
Hist( ~WInd0(~z))
> = D · [~x, n]>
∣∣∣ [~Z]Ind0(~z) = ~0)
F3 = Pr([Hist(~Z)]0 < 0.9dn)
We now show that given [Hist(~z)]0 ≥ 0.9dn, for any ~x ∈ Zq−o−1≥0 ,
F2(~z, ~x) = O((0.9dn)
− o2 ) = O(n−
o
2 ),
which follows after the following claim, where n = |Ind0(~z)| and q∗ = o + 1. The claim can be
seen as a multi-value extension of the Littlewood-Offord-Erdo˝s anti-concentration bound, because it
says that the probability for Hist( ~WInd0(~z))
> to take a specific value D · [~x, n]> (which is a constant
vector given ~x) is bounded above by O(n−
o
2 ).
Claim 1. Given q∗ ∈ N and d > 0. There exists a constant C∗ > 0 such that for any n ∈ N and any
vector ~Y ′ = (Y ′1 , . . . , Y
′
n) of n independent random variables over [q
∗], each of which is bounded
above 0 by d, and any vector ~p ∈ Zq∗≥0, we have Pr(Hist(~Y ′) = ~p) < C∗n
1−q∗
2 .
Proof. When ~p · ~1 6= n the inequality holds for any C∗ > 0. Suppose ~p · ~1 = n, we prove the
claim by induction on q∗. When q∗ = 1 the claim holds for any C∗1 > 1. Suppose the claim holds
for q∗ = q′ − 1 w.r.t. constant C∗q′−1. W.l.o.g. suppose p1 ≥ p2 · · · ≥ pq∗ . When q∗ = q′, we
use the following representation of Y ′1 , . . . , Y
′
n that is similar to Definition 9. For each j ≤ n, let
Y ′j be represented by the Bayesian network with two random variables Z
′
j ∈ {0, 1} and its child
W ′j ∈ {1, . . . , q′}. Let Pr(Z ′j = 0) = Pr(Y ′j ∈ {1, . . . , q′ − 1}) and Pr(Z ′j = 1) = Pr(Y ′j = q′)
. Let Pr(W ′j = q
′|Z ′j = 1) = 1 and for all l ≤ q′ − 1, Pr(W ′j = l|Z ′j = 0) = Pr(Y ′j = l|Y ′j ∈
{1, . . . q′ − 1}).
It follows that Pr(Z ′j = 0,W
′
j = q
′) = 0, Pr(Y ′j = q
′) = Pr(Z ′j = 1,W
′
j = q
′), and for all
l ≤ q′ − 1, Pr(Y ′j = l) = Pr(Z ′j = 0,W ′j = l) and Pr(Z ′j = 1,W ′j = l) = 0. In other words, Z ′j
determines whether Y ′j ∈ {1, . . . , q′ − 1} (corresponding to Z ′j = 0) or Y ′j = q′ (corresponding to
Z ′j = 1), and W
′
j determines the value of Y
′
j conditioned on Z
′
j . By the law of total probability, we
have:
Pr(Hist(~Y ′) = ~p) =
∑
~z∈{0,1}n:~z·~1=pq′
Pr
(
Hist( ~W ′) = ~p
∣∣∣ ~Z ′ = ~z) · Pr(~Z ′ = ~z),
We note thatW ′js are independent of each other given ~Z
′, and Pr(Wj = q′|Zj = 1) = 1. Therefore,
for any ~z ∈ {0, 1}n with ~z ·~1 = pq′ , we have
Pr
(
Hist( ~W ′) = ~p
∣∣∣ ~Z ′ = ~z) = Pr(Hist( ~W ′)−q′ = ~p−q′ ∣∣∣ ~Z ′Ind0(~z) = ~0)
≤C∗q′−1|n− pq′ |(2−q
′)/2 ≤ C∗q′−1(
q′ − 1
q′
)(2−q
′)/2n(2−q
′)/2
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where Hist(~Z ′)−q′ is the subvector of Hist(~Z ′) by taking out the q′-th component and ~p−q′ =
(p1, . . . , pq′−1). The first inequality follows after the induction hypothesis, because each W ′j with
j ∈ Ind0(~z) is a random variable over {1, . . . , q′ − 1} that is strictly above 0 by d. The second step
uses the assumption that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pq′ , which means that pq′ ≤ 1q′n. The next claim, which
can be seen as an extension of the Littlewood-Offord-Erdo˝s anti-concentration bound to Poisson
binomial distributions, proves that Pr(~Z ′ ·~1 = pq′) = O(n−1/2).
Claim 2. There exists a constant C ′ that does not depend on n or q′ such that Pr(~Z ′ · ~1 = pq′) ≤
C ′n−1/2.
Proof. For any j ≤ n, recall that Pr(Z ′j = 0) ≥ d and Pr(Z ′j = 1) ≥ d. Therefore, for all j ≤ n,
Var(Z ′j) ≥ d(1−d) and there exists a constant ρ such that for all j ≤ n, E(|Z ′j−E(Z ′j)|3) < ρ. Let
µ =
∑n
j=1 Z
′
j and σ =
√∑n
j=1 Var(Z
′
j). We have σ ≥
√
nd(1− d). By Berry-Esseen theorem
(Theorem 4 in Appendix 15), there exists a constant C0 such that:
Pr(~Z ′ ·~1 = pq′) ≤ Pr(pq′ − 1 < ~Z ′ ·~1 ≤ pq′ + 1) = Pr(pq
′ − 1
σ
≤
~Z ′ ·~1
σ
≤ pq′ + 1
σ
)
≤(Hist(pq′ − µ+ 1
σ
)− Hist(pq′ − µ− 1
σ
)) + 2C0(nd(1− d))−3/2nρ
≤ 2
σ
+ 2C0(nd(1− d))−3/2nρ ≤
(
2√
d(1− d) +
2C0ρ
(d(1− d))3/2
)
n−1/2
The claim follows by letting C ′ = 2√
d(1−d) +
2C0ρ
(d(1−d))3/2 .
Finally, we have
Pr(Hist(~Y ′) = ~p) ≤ C∗q′−1(
q′ − 1
q′
)(2−q
′)/2n(2−q
′)/2
∑
~z∈{0,1}n:~z·~1=pq′
Pr(~Z ′ = ~z)
≤C ′n−1/2C∗q′−1(
q′ − 1
q′
)(2−q
′)/2n(2−q
′)/2
This proves the q∗ = q′ case by letting C∗q′ = C
′C∗q′−1(
q′−1
q′ )
(2−q′)/2. This completes the proof of
Claim 1.
Because random variables in ~Y are bounded, for all j ≤ n, Zj takes 0 with probability at least d.
Therefore, E(~Z·~1) > dn. By Hoeffding’s inequality, F3 = Pr([Hist(~Z)]0 < 0.9dn) is exponentially
small in n, which means that it is O(n−
o
2 ). We also note that for any ~z and ~x we have F1(~z, ~x) ≤ 1.
Therefore, continuing (6), we have:
Pr(CA( ~X~pi)) ≤
∑
~z∈{0,1}n:[Hist(~z)]0≥0.9dn
Pr(~Z = ~z)
∑
~x∈Zq−o−1≥0
F1(~z, ~x)× F2(~z, ~x) + F3
≤
∑
~z∈{0,1}n:[Hist(~z)]0≥0.9dn
Pr(~Z = ~z)O(n−
o
2 ) +O(n−
o
2 ) = O(n−
o
2 )
This proves the upper bound when SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB ∩ CH(Π) 6= ∅.
Tightness of the upper bound when SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB ∩ CH(Π) = ∅. We first prove the
following claim that will be frequently used in this proof. The claim follows after a straightforward
application of Theorem 1(i) in [13]. It states that for any ~x ∈ SolAB and any l > 0, SolAB contains
an integer vector that is close to l · ~x.
Claim 3. Suppose SolAB 6= ∅. There exists a constant C ′ > 0 such that for any ~x ∈ SolAB, there
exists an integer vector ~x∗ ∈ SolAB with |~x∗ − l · ~x|∞ < C ′.
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Proof. We first prove that SolAB contains an integer vector. Because SolAB 6= ∅ andA is an integer
matrix, SolAB contains a rational solution ~x′, which can be chosen from the neighborhood of any
vector in SolAB. It follows that for any L > 0, L · ~x′ ∈ SolAB because A · (L · ~x′)> = (~0)> and
B · (L · ~x′)> > (~0)>. It is not hard to see that there exists L ∈ N such that L · ~x′ ∈ Zq≥0.
The claim then follows after Theorem 1(i) in [13] by replacing B · (~x)> > (~0)> with equivalent
constraints B · (L · ~x′)> ≥ (~1)>.
Let C ′ denote the constant in Claim 3. W.l.o.g. let ~x ∈ SolAB denote an arbitrary solution such
that ~x > C ′ · ~1; otherwise we consider ~x + (|~x|∞ + C ′) · ~1 ∈ SolAB. For any l ∈ N, let ~x∗l
denote the integer vector in SolAB that is guaranteed by Claim 3; let nl = ~x∗l · ~1; and let ~pil ∈ Πnl
denote an arbitrary vector of nl distributions, each of which is chosen from Π. Let ~yl ∈ [q]nl denote
an arbitrary vector with Hist(~yl) = ~x∗l . We note that for any l ∈ N, each distribution in ~pil is
bounded above 0 by d. Therefore, Pr( ~X~pil = ~yl) ≥ dnl = exp(nl log d), which is exp(−O(nl)).
It is not hard to verify that for any l ∈ N, ~x∗l is strictly positive and nl+1nl is bounded above by a
constant, denoted by Cˆ. Let C = max(n1, Cˆ). This proves the tightness of the upper bound when
SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB ∩ CH(Π) = ∅.
Tightness of the upper bound when SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB ∩ CH(Π) 6= ∅. Let ~x∗ ∈
SolAB ∩ CH(Π) and write ~x∗ =
∑k
i=1 αipii as a linear combination of vectors in Π. The tight-
ness of the upper bound will be proved in the following four steps. Step 1. For every l ∈ N
we prove that there exists an integer vector ~yl ∈ SolAB that is Θ(
√
l) away from l · ~x∗. Then,
we define ~pil = (~pil1, . . . , ~pi
l
k) ∈ Πnl , where for all i ≤ k, ~pili is approximately lαi copies
of pii, which means that nl = Θ(l). Step 2. We identify Ω(n
(q−1)(k−1)+q−o−1
2 ) combinations
of values of Hist( ~X~pil1), . . . ,Hist(
~X~pilk), such that the sum of each such combination is no more
than O(
√
nl) away from ~y
l and is a solution to CAB(~x). Step 3. We prove that the probabil-
ity of each such combination is Ω(n
(1−q)
2
l ) by applying Claim 4 below. Finally, we will have
Pr( ~X~pi ∈ SolAB) ≥ Ω(n
(q−1)(k−1)+q−o−1
2
l )× Ω(n
(1−q)
2
l )
k = Ω(n
− o2
l ).
Step 1. Let ~x# ∈ SolAB and ~x∗ ∈ SolAB ∩ CH(Π). W.l.o.g. suppose ~x# is strictly positive;
otherwise let l > 0 denote an arbitrary number such that ~x# + l · ~1 is strictly positive, and because
A · (~1)> = (~0)> and B · (~1)> = (~0)>, we have ~x# + l ·~1 ∈ SolAB. Because ~x∗ ∈ SolAB∩CH(Π),
we can write ~x∗ =
∑k
i=1 αipii, where for all i ≤ k, αi > 0 and pii ∈ Π, and
∑k
i=1 αi = 1. We note
that ~x∗ > d ·~1, because Π is bounded above 0 by d.
For any sufficiently large l ∈ N, we let ~yl# ∈ SolAB denote the integer approximation to
√
l · ~x#
that is guaranteed by Claim 3; let ~yl∗ denote the integer approximation to l · ~x∗ that is guaranteed
by Claim 3, where we merge all rows ~B in B with ~B · ~x∗ = 0 to A before applying the claim. It
follows that ~yl∗ ∈ SolAB. Let C denote an arbitrary constant such that |~yl# −
√
l · ~x#|∞ < C and
|~yl∗ − l · ~x∗|∞ < C.
Let ~yl = ~yl# + ~yl∗ and let nl = ~yl · ~1. It follows that ~yl is a strictly positive integer solution to
CAB(~x) and each of its element is Θ(nl). We now define ~pil that is approximately l copies of ~x∗.
Formally, for each i ≤ k − 1, let ~pili denote the vector of βi = blαic copies of pii. Let ~pilk denote
the vector of βk = nl −
∑k−1
i=1 βi copies of pik. It follows that for any i ≤ k − 1, |βi − lαi| ≤ 1,
and |βk − lαk| ≤ k + ~yl# · ~1 = O(
√
l) = O(
√
nl). Let ~pi
l = (~pil1, . . . , ~pi
l
k) denote the vector of nl
distributions. It follows that |E( ~X~pil)− ~yl|∞ = O(
√
nl).
Step 2. We define a set Xl ⊆ Nqk of vectors (~x1, . . . , ~xk) such that ~xi = (xi1, . . . , xiq) ∈ Nq
will be used as a target value for ~X~pili soon in the proof. Let Xl denote the set of all integer vectors
(~x1, . . . , ~xk) that satisfy the following three conditions.
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(i) Let ζ > 0 be a constant whose value will be specified later. For any i ≤ k − 1 and any
j ≤ q− 1, we require |xij −pilijβi| < ζ
√
nl, where ~pi
l
i = (pi
l
i1, . . . , pi
l
iq). Therefore, |xiq −piliqβi| <
(q − 1)ζ√nl, because
∑
j≤q xij = βi.
(ii) Let ρ be the least common multiple of the denominators of all entries in D. For example, in
Example 3 we have ρ = 2. For each o + 2 ≤ j ≤ q, we require |xkj − (ylj −
∑k−1
i=1 xij)| < ζ
√
nl
and ρ divides xkj − (ylj −
∑k−1
i=1 xij).
(iii) ~x =
∑k
i=1 ~xi is a solution to (~xI0)
> = D · [~xI1 , nl]>.
Each element (~x1, . . . , ~xk) of Xl can be generated in the following three steps. First, ~x1, . . . , ~xk−1
are arbitrarily chosen according to condition (i) above. Second, xk(o+2), . . . , xkq are chosen ac-
cording to condition (ii) above given ~x1, . . . , ~xk−1. This guarantees that for each o + 2 ≤ j ≤ q,∑k
i=1 xij is no more than O(
√
nl) away from y
l
j and
∑k
i=1 xij − ylj is divisible by ρ. Finally,
xk1, . . . , xk(o+1) are determined by condition (iii) together with other components of ~x that are
specified in the first and second step. More precisely,
 xk1...
xk(o+1)
 = D ·

∑k
i=1 xi(o+2)
...∑k
i=1 xiq
nl
−
k−1∑
i=1
 xi1...
xi(o+1)

xk1, . . . , xk(o+1) are integers because for all o + 2 ≤ j ≤ q, ρ divides yj −
∑k
i=1 xij and D ·
[~yI1 , nl]
T = [~yI0 , nl]
T . We let ζ > 0 be a sufficiently small constant that does not depend on nl,
such that the following two conditions hold.
(1) Each (~x1, . . . , ~xk) ∈ Xl is strictly positive. This can be achieved by assigning ζ a small positive
value, because |∑ki=1 ~xi−~yl|∞ = O(ζ)√nl and each element in ~yl is strictly positive and is Θ(nl).
(2) For any (~x1, . . . , ~xk) ∈ Xl, we have
∑k
i=1 ~xi ∈ SolAB. Let ~x =
∑k
i=1 ~xi. By definition we
haveA·(~x)> = (~0)>. We also haveB·(~x)> = B·(~x−~yl)>+B·(~yl)> ≥ B·(~x−~yl)>+B·(~yl#)>.
Notice that |∑ki=1 ~xi−~yl|∞ = O(ζ)√nl and each element inB ·(~yl#)> is Θ(nl). Therefore, when
ζ is sufficiently small we have B · (~x)> > 0. This means that when ζ > 0 is sufficiently small we
have ~x ∈ SolAB.
For any l with ζ
√
nl
ρ > 1, we have:
|Xl| ≥ ( 1ρ )q−o−1ζ(q−1)(k−1)+q−o−1n((q−1)(k−1)+q−o−1)/2l = Ω(n((q−1)(k−1)+q−o−1)/2l ).
This is because according to condition (i) there are at least (ζ
√
nl)
(q−1)(k−1) combinations of values
for ~x1, . . . , ~xk−1, and according to condition (ii) there are at least (
ζ
√
nl
ρ )
q−o−1 combinations of
values for xk(o+2), . . . , xkq .
Step 3. By the definition of Xl, there exists a constant α > 0 that does not depend on nl such that
for each (~x1, . . . , ~xk) ∈ Xl and each i ≤ k, we have |~xi−βipii|∞ < α
√
nl. Also because all agents’
preferences are independently generated, we have: Pr(∀i ≤ k, ~X~pii = ~xi) =
∏k
i=1 Pr(
~X~pii = ~xi).
We note that for each i ≤ k, ~X~pii is the histogram of βi i.i.d. random variables, each of which is
distributed as pii. The next claim implies that for each i ≤ k, Pr( ~X~pii = ~xi) is Ω(n(1−q)/2l ).
Claim 4. Given q ∈ N, d > 0, α > 0. There exists a constant β > 0 such that for any distribution
pi over [q] that is bounded above 0 by d, any n ∈ N, and any vector ~p ∈ Zq≥0 with ~p · ~1 = n and
|~p − npi|∞ < α
√
n, we have Pr( ~Xpi = ~p) > βn
1−q
2 , where ~Xpi is the histogram of n i.i.d. random
variables, each of which is distributed as in pi.
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Proof. Let ~p = (p1, . . . , pq), and let ~d = ~p− npi. We have:
Pr( ~Xpi = ~p) =
(
n
p1
)(
n− p1
p2
)
· · ·
(
pq−1 + pq
pq−1
) q∏
i=1
pipii =
n!∏q
i=1 pi!
q∏
i=1
pipii
≥
1√
2λn
(n/e)n∏q
i=1(
1√
2λpi
e1/12(pi/e)pi)
q∏
i=1
pipii = Cn
1−q
2
nn∏q
i=1 p
pi
i
q∏
i=1
pipii (7)
=Cn
1−q
2
q∏
i=1
(
npii
pi
)npii q∏
i=1
(
npii
pi
)pi−npii
≥ Cn 1−q2
q∏
i=1
(
npii
pi
)di
(8)
Inequality (7) is due to Robbins’ Stirling approximation [44], where λ represents ratio of circumfer-
ence to diameter to distinguish from the distribution pi. C is a constant that does not depend on n.
Inequality (8) is because
∏q
i=1
(
npii
pi
)npii
= exp
(
nDKL(pi‖ ~pn )
)
, where DKL(pi‖ ~pn ) is the KL diver-
gence of ~pn from pi, which is non-negative, meaning that
∏q
i=1
(
npii
pi
)npii ≥ 1. Let pimin = mini pii.
q∏
i=1
(
npii
pi
)di
=
q∏
i=1
1
(1 + dinpii )
di
≥
∏
i≤q:di<0
1
(1 + dinpii )
di
≥
(
(1− α
√
n
npimin
)α
√
n
)q
=
(
(1− α
pimin
√
n
)
pimin
√
n
α
)qα2/pimin
As limx→∞(1 − 1x )x = 1e , when n is large enough we have
∏q
i=1
(
npii
pi
)di
> ( 12e )
qα2/pimin which
is a constant that does not depend on n. This proves that Pr( ~Xpi = ~p) = Ω(n
1−q
2 ).
By Claim 4, we have Pr( ~X~pii = ~xi) = Ω(β
(1−q)/2
i ) = Ω(n
(1−q)/2
l ).
Finally, we have Pr( ~X~pi ∈ SolAB) ≥ Ω(n
(q−1)(k−1)+q−o−1
2
l ) × Ω(n
(1−q)
2
l )
k = Ω(n
− o2
l ). Note that
we require l to be sufficiently large such that ζ
√
nl
ρ > 1 in order to guarantee that |Xl| is large
enough. Because nl = Θ(l), there exists a constant Cˆ such that for any l ∈ N, nl+1nl < Cˆ. Let
C = max(nL+1, Cˆ). This proves the tightness of the upper bound when SolAB 6= ∅ and SolAB ∩
CH(Π) 6= ∅.
7.1 Examples
Example 2. Let m = 3 and A = {1, 2, 3}. For any profile P , let x123 denote the number of
1  2  3 in P . The event “alternatives 1 and 2 are co-winners under Borda as well as the only
two weak Condorcet winner” can be represented by the following constraints.
2(x123 + x132) + x213 + x312 = 2(x213 + x231) + x123 + x321 (9)
x123 + x132 + x312 = x213 + x231 + x321 (10)
2(x123 + x132) + x213 + x312 > 2(x312 + x321) + x132 + x231 (11)
x123 + x132 + x213 > x312 + x321 + x231 (12)
x231 + x213 + x123 > x312 + x321 + x132 (13)
Equation (9) says that the Borda scores of 1 and 2 are the same; equation (10) says that 1 and 2
are tied in their head-to-head competition; inequality (11) says that the Borda sore of 1 is strictly
higher than the Borda score of 3; and inequalities (12) and (13) requires that 1 and 2 beat 3 in their
head-to-head competitions, respectively.
Example 3. We show how to obtain D using the setting in Example 2. Let ~x =
[x123, x132, x213, x231, x312, x321]. The reduced echelon form of A′ and its corresponding equa-
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tions can be calculated as follows.[
1 2 −1 −2 1 −1 0
1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 n
]
R1;R2−R1;R3−R1−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[
1 2 −1 −2 1 −1 0
0 −1 0 1 0 0 0
0 −1 2 3 0 2 n
]
R1+2R2;−R2;R3−R2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[
1 0 −1 0 1 −1 0
0 1 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 2 2 0 2 n
]
R1+R2/2;R2;R3/2−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[
1 0 0 1 1 0 n2
0 1 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 n2
]
The text above each arrow represents the matrix operations. R1, R2, R3 represents the first, sec-
ond, and the third row vector of the matrix on the left. For example, “R1;R2 − R1;R3 − R1”
represents that the in the right matrix, the first row is R1 of the left matrix; the second row is ob-
tained by subtracting R1 from R2; and the third row is obtained from subtracting R1 from R3. Let
I0 = [x123, x132, x213] and I1 = [x231, x312, x321]. We have D =
 −1 −1 0 121 0 0 0
−1 0 −1 12
 and
[
x123
x132
x213
]
= D×
 x231x312x321
n
.
8 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. (Smoothed likelihood of Codorcet’s paradox). LetM = (Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly
positive and closed single-agent preference model.
Smoothed avoidance of Condorcet’s paradox. Suppose for all pi ∈ CH(Π), UMG(pi) does not
contain a weak Condorcet cycle. Then, for any n ∈ N, we have:
min~pi∈Πn EP∼~piSNCC(P ) = 1− exp(−Ω(n))
Smoothed Condorcet’s paradox. Suppose there exists pi ∈ CH(Π) such that UMG(pi) contains a
weak Condorcet cycle. Then, there exist infinitely many n ∈ N such that:
min~pi∈Πn EP∼~piSNCC(P ) = 1− Ω(1)
Proof. The theorem is proved by applying Lemma 1 multiple times, where CAB represents the
profiles whose UMG contains a specific weak Codorcet cycle. Formally, we have the following
definitions.
Definition 10 (Variables and pairwise constraints). For any linear order R ∈ L(A), let xR be a
variable that represents the number of times R occurs in a profile. Let XA = {xR : R ∈ L(A)} and
let ~xA denote the vector of elements of XA w.r.t. a fixed order. For any pair of different alternatives
a, b, let Paira,b(~xA) denote the linear combination of variables in XA, where for any R ∈ L(A),
the coefficient of xR is 1 if a R b; otherwise the coefficient is −1.
For any profile P , Paira,b(Hist(P )) is the weight on the a  b edge in WMG(P ). It is not hard to
check that Paira,b(~1) = 0.
Definition 11. For any unweighted directed graph G over A, we define CG to be the constraints as
in Definition 4 that is based on matrices AG = {Paira,b(~xA) = 0 : (a, b) 6∈ G and (b, a) 6∈ G}
and BG = {Paira,b(~xA) > 0 : (a, b) ∈ G}. Let SolG and SolG denote the solutions to CG and its
relaxation CG as in Definition 4, respectively.
We immediate have the following claim.
Claim 5. For any profile P and any unweighted directed graph G over A, Hist(P ) ∈ SolG if and
only if G = UMG(P ); Hist(P ) ∈ SolG if and only if UMG(P ) is a subgraph of G. Moreover,
Rank(AG) equals to the number of ties in G.
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Proof. The necessary and sufficient conditions for Hist(P ) ∈ SolG and Hist(P ) ∈ SolG follow
from the definitions. Because the number of equations in AG equals to the number of ties in G,
it suffices to prove that the equations in AG are independent. This is true because for any pair of
alternatives (a, b), the UMG of the following profile of two rankings only contains one edge a→ b:
a  b  others and rev  a  b, where rev is the reverse order of others.
Proof of the smoothed avoidance part. Let C denote the set of all CG, where G is an unweighted
directed graph without weak Condorcet cycles. We have the following observations. (1) For any
profile P , SNCC(P ) = 0 if and only if there exists G ∈ C such that Hist(P ) ∈ SolG. To see
this, when SNCC(P ) = 0, we have Hist(P ) ∈ SolUMG(P ) and UMG(P ) ∈ C; and vice versa,
if Hist(P ) ∈ SolG for some G ∈ C, then SNCC(P ) = 0. (2) For any graph G, SolG 6= ∅ by
McGarvey’s theorem. (3) The total number of UMGs over A only depends on m not on n, which
means that |C| can be seen as a constant that does not depend on n.
The three observations imply that for any distribution of P , we have
Pr(SNCC(P ) = 0) ≤
∑
G∈C
Pr(Hist(P ) ∈ SolG)
Therefore, based on observation (3) above, to prove the smoothed avoidance part of the theorem, it
suffices to prove that for any n, any ~pi ∈ Πn, and any G ∈ C, we have PrP∼~pi(Hist(P ) ∈ SolG) =
exp(−Ω(n)). This follows after the exponential case in Lemma 1 applied to CG. To see this, we first
note that SolG 6= ∅ according to observation (2) above. Also for each pi ∈ Π, because UMG(pi) does
not contain a weak Condorcet cycle, UMG(pi) is not a subgraph of G, which contains a Condorcet
cycle. Therefore, Hist(pi) 6∈ SolG due to Claim 5, which means that SolG ∩ CH(pi) = ∅.
Proof of the smoothed paradox part. Let pi ∈ CH(Π) denote any distribution such that UMG(pi)
contains a weak Condorcet cycle. Let G denote an arbitrary supergraph of UMG(pi) that contains
a Condorcet cycle, e.g. by completing the weak Condorcet cycle in UMG(pi). The weak smoothed
paradox part is proved by applying the tightness of the polynomial case in Lemma 1 applied to SolG
following a similar argument with the proof for the smoothed avoidance part.
9 Additional Preliminaries and Examples of Group Theory
The symmetric group over A = [m], denoted by SA, is the set of all permutations over A. A
permutation σ that maps each a ∈ A to σ(a) can be represented in two ways.
• Two-line form: σ is represented by a 2×m matrix, where the first row is (1, 2, . . . ,m) and
the second row is (σ(1), σ(2), . . . , σ(m)).
• Cycle form: σ is represented by non-overlapping cycles over A, where each cycle
(a1, · · · , ak) represent ai+1 = σ(ai) for all i ≤ k − 1, and with a1 = σ(ak).
It follows that any cycle in the cycle form (a1, · · · , ak) is equivalent to (a2, · · · , ak, a1). Follow-
ing the convention, in the cycle form a1 is the smallest elements in the cycle. For example, all
permutations in S3 are represented in two-line form and cycle form respective in the Table 1.
Table 1: S[3] where m = 3.
Two-line
(
1 2 3
1 2 3
)(
1 2 3
2 1 3
)(
1 2 3
1 3 2
)(
1 2 3
3 2 1
)(
1 2 3
2 3 1
)(
1 2 3
3 1 2
)
Cycle () or Id (1, 2) (2, 3) (1, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 3, 2)
A permutation groupG is a subgroup of SA where the identity element is the identity permutation Id,
and for any σ, η ∈ SA, σ ◦ η is the permutation where for any linear order V ∈ L(A), (σ ◦ η)(V ) =
σ(η(V )). For example, (1, 2) ◦ (2, 3) = (1, 2, 3), because 1  2  3 is first mapped to 1  3  2
by permutation (2, 3), then to 2  3  1 by permutation (1, 2). There are six subgroups of S[3]:
{Id}, {Id, (1, 2)}, {Id, (2, 3)}, {Id, (1, 3)}, {Id, (1, 2, 3), (1, 3, 2)}, and S[3].
Example 4. Table 2 shows all permutation groups over S[3] as the result of Perm(P ) for some
profiles.
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Table 2: Examples of Perm(P ), where 123 represents 1  2  3.
P P [123]P [132]P [213]P [231]P [312]P [321] Perm(P )
P1 1 2 2 2 2 2 {Id}
P2 3 5 3 5 4 4 {Id, (1, 2)}
P3 3 5 4 4 5 3 {Id, (1, 3)}
P4 3 3 5 4 5 4 {Id, (2, 3)}
P5 3 5 5 3 3 5 {Id, (1, 2, 3), (1, 3, 2)}
P6 1 1 1 1 1 1 S[3]
P1 in the table consists of one ranking for 1  2  3 and two rankings for each of the remaining
five linear orders. Perm(P1) only contains Id because if it contains any other permutation σ, then
we must have P [1  2  3] = P [σ(1  2  3)], which is impossible. (12) ∈ Perm(P2)
because P2[1  2  3] = P2[2  1  3] = 3, P2[1  3  2] = P2[2  3  1] = 5, and
P2[3  1  2] = P2[3  2  1] = 4. It is not hard to verify that no other permutations except Id
belong to Perm(P2).
10 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. (Smoothed folklore (im)possibility theorem). LetM = (Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly
positive and closed single-agent preference model. Let UΠm = {U ∈ Um : ∃pi ∈ CH(Π),∀σ ∈
U, σ(pi) = pi}, and when UΠm 6= ∅, let lmin = minU∈UΠm |U | and lΠ = lmin−1lmin m!.
Smoothed possibility. There exist an anonymous voting rule rano and a neutral voting rule rneu such
that for any r ∈ {rano, rneu}, any n, and any ~pi ∈ Πn, we have:
PrP∼~pi(Sano(r, P ) + Sneu(r, P ) < 2) =
{
O(n−
lΠ
2 ) if UΠm 6= ∅
exp(−Ω(n)) otherwise
Smoothed impossibility. For any voting rule r, there exist infinitely many n ∈ N such that:
max~pi∈Πn PrP∼~pi(Sano(r, P ) + Sneu(r, P ) < 2) =
{
Ω(n−
lΠ
2 ) if UΠm 6= ∅
exp(−O(n)) otherwise
Proof. Step 1. Identifying the source of the folklore impossibility theorem.
Definition 12. For any n ∈ N and any m ≥ 2, let Tm,n denote the set of n-profiles P such that
Perm(P ) ∈ Um. That is,
Tm,n = {P ∈ L(A)n : Perm(P ) covers A}
The following lemma states that profiles in Tm,n are the intrinsic source of the folklore impossibility
theorem.
Lemma 3. For any voting rule r, any n ∈ N, any m ≥ 2, and any P ∈ Tm,n, we have:
Sano(r, P ) + Sneu(r, P ) ≤ 1 (14)
Proof. We first partition Tm,n to Hist−1(H1) ∪ · · · ∪ Hist−1(HJ), where H1, . . . ,HJ are some
histograms of n votes. The partition exists because for any P ∈ Tm,n and any profile P ′ with
Hist(P ′) = Hist(P ), we have Perm(P ′) = Perm(P ) ∈ Um, which means that P ′ ∈ Tm,n. For any
j ≤ J , if there exist P1, P2 ∈ Hist−1(Hj) such that r(P1) 6= r(P2), then for all P ∈ Hist−1(Hj)
we have Sano(P ) = 0, which means that inequality (14) holds for all P ∈ Hist−1(Hj). Otherwise if
r(P ) = a for all P ∈ Hj , then by the definition of Tm,n there exists a permutation σ over A such
that Hist(σ(P )) = Hist(P ) and σ(a) 6= a. This means that σ(P ) ∈ Hj , and therefore, r(σ(P )) =
a 6= σ(r(P )), which means that Sneu(P ) = 0. Again, inequality (14) holds for P ∈ Hist−1(Hj).
This proves the lemma.
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Step 2. Smoothed possibility. First, we define rano and rneu by extending a voting rule r∗ that
is defined on L(A)n \ Tm,n and is guaranteed to satisfy anonymity and neutrality simultaneously
for all profiles that are not in Tm,n. More precisely, for any pair of profiles P and P ′, we write
P ≡ P ′ if and only if there exists a permutation σ ∈ SA such that Hist(P ′) = σ(Hist(P )). Let
(L(A) \ Tm,n) = D1 ∪ · · · ∪ DL′ denote the partition w.r.t. ≡. For each l ≤ L′, let Pl ∈ Dl
denote an arbitrary profile. Because Pl 6∈ Tm,n, there exists an alternative al that is not covered by
Perm(P ). Then, for any P ′ ∈ Dl and any permutation σ such that Hist(P ′) = σ(Hist(P )), we let
r∗(P ′) = σ(al). We note that the choice of σ does not matter, because all permutations σ that map
Hist(P ) to Hist(P ′) have the same image for al. To see this, for the sake of contradiction, suppose
Hist(P ′) = σ1(Hist(P )) = σ2(Hist(P )) where σ1(al) 6= σ2(al). Then, we have σ−11 ◦ σ2 ∈
Perm(P ), and (σ−11 ◦ σ2)(al) 6= al, which is a contradiction to the assumption that Perm(P ) does
not cover al.
Claim 6. For any profile P 6∈ Tm,n we have Sano(r∗, P ) = 1 and Sneu(r∗, P ) = 1.
Proof. By definition, for all profiles P 6∈ Tm,n, r∗(P ) only depends on Hist(P ), which means that
Sano(r∗, P ) = 1. To prove Sneu(r∗, P ) = 1, let P ∈ Dl for some l ≤ L and let σ ∈ SA denote
a permutation over alternatives. We first prove that σ(P ) ∈ Dl. Let P ′ = σ(P ). For the sake of
contradiction suppose P ′ 6∈ Dl. Then we have P ′ ∈ Tm,n. Therefore, for any alternative a ∈ A,
there exists η ∈ Perm(P ′) such that η(σ(a)) 6= σ(a). It follows that (σ−1 ◦ η ◦ σ) ∈ Perm(P )
and (σ−1 ◦ η ◦ σ)(a) 6= a. Therefore, Perm(P ) covers A, which contradicts the assumption that
P 6∈ Tm,n. Let P = ζ(Pl), where Pl is the profile chosen in the definition of r∗. It follows that
P ′ = (σ ◦ ζ)(Pl). Therefore, we have r∗(P ′) = (σ ◦ ζ)(al) = σ(ζ(al)) = σ(r∗(P )). This proves
the claim.
For any profile P 6∈ Tm,n, we let rano(P ) = rneu(P ) = r∗(P ). For any profile P in Tm,n, we let
rano(P ) = a for an arbitrary fixed alternative a, and let rneu(P ) be the top-ranked alternative of agent
1. By Claim 6, for any r ∈ {rano, rneu} any n, and any ~θ ∈ Πn, PrP∼~θ(Sano(r, P ) + Sneu(r, P ) <
2) ≥ PrP∼~θ(P ∈ Tm,n). Therefore, it suffices to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4. For any r ∈ {rano, rneu}, any n, and any ~pi ∈ Θn, we have:
Pr
P∼~pi
(P ∈ Tm,n) =
{
O(n−
lΠ
2 ) if UΠm 6= ∅
exp(−Ω(n)) otherwise .
Proof. The lemma is proved by applying the upper bound in Lemma 1 as in the proof of Theorem 1.
For any U ∈ Um, we define constrains CU as follows.
Definition 13. For any U ∈ Um, we define CU as in Definition 4 that is based on AU and BU ,
where AU represents {xR − xσ(R) = 0 : ∀R ∈ L(A),∀σ ∈ U} and BU = ∅. Let SolU and SolU
denote the solutions to CU and its relaxation CU as in Definition 4, respectively.
By definition, AU (xR) = 0 if and only if for all σ ∈ U , xR = σ(xR). Because BU = ∅, we have
CU = CU , which means that SolU = SolU . We have the following claim about CU .
Claim 7. For any profile P and any U ∈ Um, Hist(P ) ∈ SolU if and only if for all σ ∈ U ,
Hist(P ) = σ(Hist(P )). Moreover, Rank(AU ) = (1− 1|U | )m!.
Proof. The “if and only if” part follows after the definition. We now prove that Rank(AU ) =
(1 − 1|U | )m!. Let ≡U denote the relationship over L(A) such that for any pair of linear orders
R1, R2, R1 ≡U R2 if and only if there exists σ ∈ U such that R1 = σ(R2). Because U is a
permutation group, ≡U is an equivalence relationship that partitions L(A) into m!|U | groups, each
of which has |U | linear orders. It is not hard to see that each equivalent class is characterized by
|U | − 1 linearly independent equations represented by rows in AU , which means that Rank(AU ) ≤
(|U | − 1)(m!|U | ) = (1 − 1|U | )m!. For any s < (1 − 1|U | )m! and any combination of s rows of AU ,
denoted by A, it is not hard to construct ~x such that A × (~x)> = (~0)> but AU × (~x)> 6= (~0)>,
which proves that Rank(AU ) ≥ (1− 1|U | )m!. This proves the claim.
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Let C denote the set of all CU where U ∈ Um as in Definition 13. We have the follow-
ing observations. (1) C characterizes Tm,n, because by Claim 7, for any P ∈ Tm,n we have
Hist(P ) ∈ SolPerm(P ) and Perm(P ) ∈ C; and vice versa, for any CU ∈ C and any P such that
Hist(P ) ∈ SolU , by Claim 7 we have Perm(P ) ⊇ U , which means that Perm(P ) covers A, and it
follows that P ∈ Tm,n. (2) For any U ∈ Um, SolU 6= ∅ because ~1 ∈ SolU . (3) |C| can be seen as
a constant that does not depend on n, because it is no more than the total number of permutation
groups over A.
We now prove the polynomial upper bound when UΠm 6= ∅. For any U ∈ UΠm, by Claim 7, we have
Rank(AU ) ≥ (1− 1|U | )m! ≥ (1− 1lmin )m!. By applying the polynomial upper bound in Lemma 1
to all CU ∈ C, for any ~pi ∈ Πn, we have:
Pr
P∼~pi
(P ∈ Tm,n) ≤
∑
CU∈C
Pr
P∼~pi
(Hist(P ) ∈ SolU ) =
∑
CU∈C
O(n−(
|U|−1
2|U| )m!) ≤ |C|O(n−(
lmin−1
2lmin
)m!
)
=O(n−
lΠ
2 m!)
The exponential upper bound is proved similarly, by applying the exponential upper bound in
Lemma 1 to all CU ∈ C. This proves the lemma.
Step 3. Smoothed impossibility. Lemma 3 implies that for any ~pi ∈ Πn, PrP∼~pi(Sano(r, P ) +
Sneu(r, P ) < 2) ≥ PrP∼~pi(P ∈ Tm,n). Therefore, it suffices to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For any voting rule r, there exist infinitely many n ∈ N and corresponding ~pi ∈ Πn,
such that:
Pr
P∼~pi
(P ∈ Tm,n) =
{
Ω(n−
lΠ
2 ) if UΠm 6= ∅
exp(−O(n)) otherwise .
Proof. Let C be the set as defined in the proof of Lemma 4.
Applying the lower bound in Lemma 1. We first prove the polynomial lower bound. Suppose
UΠm 6= ∅ and let U ∈ UΠm denote the permutation group with the minimum size, i.e. |U | = lmin. By
Claim 7, Rank(AU ) = (1 − 1lmin )m!. By applying the tightness of the polynomial bound part in
Lemma 1 to CU , we have that there exists constant C > 0 such that for any n′ ∈ N, there exists
n′ ≤ n ≤ Cn′ and ~pi ∈ Πn such that
Pr
P∼~pi
(Hist(P ) ∈ SolU ) = Ω(n−(
lmin−1
2lmin
)m!
)
Note that for any profile P such that Hist(P ) ∈ SolU , we have Perm(P ) ⊇ U , which means that
Perm(P ) covers A and therefore P ∈ Tm,n. Therefore, we have:
Pr
P∼~pi
(P ∈ Tm,n) ≥ Pr
P∼~pi
(Hist(P ) ∈ SolU ) ≥ Ω((Cn)−(
l−1
2l )m!) = Ω(n−(
l−1
2l )m!)
The exponential lower bound is proved similarly, by applying the tightness of the exponential bound
part in Lemma 1 to an arbitrary U ∈ Um. This proves the lemma.
This finishes the proof of Theorem 2.
10.1 Connection to the (Non-)Existence of Anonymous and Neutral Voting Rules
As a side note, Lemma 3 and Claim 6 can be used to prove Moulin’s characterization of existence of
anonymous and neutral voting rules, which was stated as Problem 1 [39], where only very high-level
ideas about the proof was presented, from which it is hard to tell how similar our proof below is with
the proof there.
Claim 8 (Problem 1 [39]). Fix any m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2, there exists a voting rule that satisfies
anonymity and neutrality if and only if m cannot be written as the sum of n’s nontrivial divisors.
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Proof. By Lemma 3 and Claim 6, there exists a voting rule that satisfies anonymity and neutrality
if and only if Tm,n = ∅. Therefore, it suffices to prove that Tm,n = ∅ if and only if m cannot be
written as the sum of n’s nontrivial divisors.
The “if” direction. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that Tm,n 6= ∅. Let P ∈ Tm,n 6= ∅ denote
an arbitrary profile. We now partition A according to the following equivalence relationship ≡.
a ≡ b if and only if there exists σ ∈ Perm(P ) such that σ(a) = b. The partition is well defined
because Perm(P ) is a permutation group. In other words, if a ≡ b then b ≡ a, because the Perm(P )
is closed under inversion. If a ≡ b (via σ1) and b ≡ c (via σ2) then a ≡ c because c = (σ2 ◦ σ1)(a),
and σ2 ◦ σ1 ∈ Perm(P ).
Suppose A = A1 ∪ · · · ∪ AL is divided into L parts according to ≡. Because P ∈ Tm,n, which
means that Perm(P ) covers A, for all l ≤ L, |Al| ≥ 2. It is not hard to check that for any l ≤ L,
we have |Al| divides |Perm(P )|. Also it is not hard to see that Perm(P ) divides n. This means that
m =
∑L
l=1 |Al| which contradicts the assumption. This proves the “if” direction.
The “only if” direction. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that m = m1 + · · ·+mL where each
ml ≥ 2 and divides n. Consider the permutation σ whose cycle form consists of L cycles whose
sizes are m1, · · · ,mL, respectively. Let U denote the permutation group generated by σ. It follows
that |U | is the least common multiple of m1, · · · ,mL, which means that |U | divides n. Therefore,
it is not hard to construct an n-profile P such that for any ranking R and any σ′ ∈ U , we must
have P [R] = P [σ′(R)]. It follows that U ⊆ Perm(P ), which means that Perm(P ) covers A, and
therefore ∈ Tm,n 6= ∅. This contradicts the assumption that ∈ Tm,n = ∅, which proves the “only if”
direction.
11 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. For any m ≥ 2, let l∗ = minU∈Um |U |. We have l∗ = 2 if m is even; l∗ = 3 if m is odd
and 3 | m; l∗ = 5 if m is odd, 3 - m, and 5 | m; and l∗ = 6 for other m.
Proof. We prove the lemma by discussing the following cases.
Case 1: 2 | m. Let σ = (1, 2)(3, 4) · · · (m − 1,m) be a permutation that consists of 2-cycles. It
follows that Id = σ2 and {Id, σ} is a permutation group that covers [m]. This means that l∗ = 2.
Case 2: 2 - m and 3 | m. Let σ = (1, 2, 3)(4, 5, 6) · · · (m − 2,m − 1,m) be a permutation that
consists of 3-cycles. It follows that Id = σ2 and {Id, σ, σ2} is a permutation group that covers [m].
This means that l∗ ≤ 3. We now prove that l∗ cannot be 2 by contradiction. Suppose for the sake
of contradiction that l∗ = 2 and let G denote a permutation group with |G| = 2. Table 3 (part of
Table 26.1 in [20]) lists all groups of orders 1 through 5 up to isomorphism. The order of a group
is the number of its elements. For any l ∈ N, a permutation group G of order l is isomorphic to Zl
if and only if G = {Id, σ, . . . , σl−1}, where σ is an order-l permutation, that is, σl = Id and for
all 1 ≤ i < l, σi 6= Id. A permutation group G of order 4 is isomorphic to Z2 ⊕ Z2 if and only if
G = {Id, σ, η, σ ◦ η}, where σ, η, and σ ◦ η are three order-2 permutations.
Table 3: All order 1 through 5 groups up to isomorphism.
Order 1 2 3 4 5
Groups {Id} Z2 Z3 Z4 or Z2 ⊕ Z2 Z5
Therefore, G = {Id, σ}. Because G covers A, the cycle form of σ must consist of 2-cycles that
cover all alternatives in A, which means that 2 | m, a contradiction.
Case 3: 2 - m, 3 - m, and 5 |m. Let σ = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) · · · (m− 4,m− 3,m− 2,m− 1,m) be a
permutation that consists of 5-cycles. It follows that Id = σ2 and {Id, σ, σ2, σ3, σ4} is a permutation
group that covers [m]. This means that l∗ ≤ 5. We now prove by contradiction that l∗ cannot be 2, 3,
or 4. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that l∗ = 2 and let G denote a permutation group whose
order is no more than 4. Because 2 - m and 3 - m, following a similar argument with Case 2 we
know that G cannot be isomorphic to Z2, Z3, or Z4. Therefore, by Table 3, G must be isomorphic
to Z2 ⊕ Z2. However, the next claim shows that this is impossible. Therefore, l∗ = 5.
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Claim 9. For any m with 2 - m, no permutation group in G ∈ Gm is isomorphic to Z2 ⊕Z2, where
Gm is the set of all permutation groups over A = [m].
Proof. We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose for the sake of contradiction 2 - m and there
exists G ∈ Gm that is isomorphic to Z2 ⊕ Z2. This means that G = {Id, σ, η, σ ◦ η}, where σ,
η, and σ ◦ η only contain 2-cycles in their cycle forms, respectively. Because 2 - m, at least one
alternative is not involved in any cycle in η. W.l.o.g. we let {1, . . . , k} denote the alternatives that
are not involved in any cycle in η, which means that they are mapped to themselves by η. It follows
that the remaining m − k alternatives are covered by 2-cycles in η, which means that k is an odd
number. For any i ≤ k, because G covers A, i must be involved in a 2-cycle in σ, otherwise none
of η, σ, or σ ◦ η will map i to a different alternative. Suppose (i, j) is a 2-cycle in σ. We note that
(σ ◦ η)(i) = j, which means that (ij) is a 2-cycle in σ ◦ η. This means that η(j) = j, that is, j ≤ k.
Therefore, {1, . . . , k} consists of 2-cycles in σ. This means that 2 | k, which is a contradiction.
Case 4: 2 - m, 3 - m, and 5 - m. Let σ = (1, 2, 3)(4, 5) · · · (m − 1,m). It follows that the
order of σ is 6, which means that {Id, σ, σ2, σ3, σ4, σ5} is a permutation group that covers [m]. This
means that l∗ ≤ 6. The proof for l∗ ≥ 6 is similar with the proof in Case 3. Suppose for the sake
of contradiction there exists G ∈ Gm with |G| ≤ 5. Then, by Table 3, G must be isomorphic to
Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5, or Z2 ⊕ Z2. However, this is impossible because none of 2, 3, or 5 can divide m,
and by claim 9, G is not isomorphic to Z2 ⊕ Z2. This proves that l∗ = 6.
11.1 A Corollary of Theorem 2 and Lemma 2
Corrollary 1. Let M = (Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly positive and closed single-agent preference
model where piuni ∈ CH(Π). Let l∗ be the number in Lemma 2.
Smoothed possibility. Let r ∈ {rano, rneu}. For any n and any ~pi ∈ Πn, we have:
Pr
P∼~pi
(Sano(r, P ) + Sneu(r, P ) < 2) = O(n−(
l∗−1
2l∗ )m!)
Smoothed impossibility. For any voting rule r, there exist infinitely many n ∈ N such that:
max
~pi∈Πn
Pr
P∼~pi
(Sano(r, P ) + Sneu(r, P ) < 2) = Ω(n−(
l∗−1
2l∗ )m!)
In particular, Corollary 1 applies to all neutral, strictly positive, and closed models, which contains
M[,1]Ma ,M[,1]Pl , and IC as a special case. This is because for any neutral model, let pi ∈ Π denote
an arbitrary distribution. Then, for any permutation σ over A, σ(pi) ∈ Π. Therefore, piuni =
1
m!
∑
σ∈SA σ(pi) ∈ CH(Π).
12 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. Let r be a voting rule obtained from a positional scoring correspondence by applying
LEX or FA. LetM = (Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly positive and closed single-agent preference model
where piuni ∈ CH(Π). There exist infinitely many n ∈ N such that:
max~pi∈Πn PrP∼~pi (Sano(r, P ) + Sneu(r, P ) < 2) = Ω(n−0.5)
Proof. Suppose r is obtained from a correspondence c by applying LEX or FA. We first prove
that any profiles P with |c(P )| = 2 violates anonymity or neutrality under r. In other words,
Sano(r, P ) + Sneu(r, P ) < 2. W.l.o.g. suppose c(P ) = {1, 2}. Suppose r is obtained from c by
applying LEX-R. W.l.o.g. suppose 1 R 2. Let σ denote the permutation that exchanges 1 and
2. Because c is neutral, c(σ(P )) = σ(c(P )) = {1, 2}. By LEX-R, r(P ) = r(σ(P )) = 1 6= 2 =
σ(r(P )), which violates neutrality. Suppose r is obtained from c by applying FA-j. W.l.o.g. suppose
1  2 in the j-th vote in P . Because c(P ) = {1, 2}, there exists a vote in P where 2  1. Suppose
2  1 in the j′-th vote. Let P ′ denote the profile obtained from P by switching j-th and j′-th vote.
Because c is anonymous, we have c(P ′) = {1, 2}. By FA-j, r(P ′) = 2 6= 1 = r(P ), which violates
anonymity.
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Therefore, for any n and any ~pi ∈ Πn, we have PrP∼~pi (Sano(r, P ) + Sneu(r, P ) < 2) ≥
PrP∼~pi(|c(P )| = 2). By applying the tightness of polynomial bound part in Lemma 1, it is not
hard to prove that for any positional scoring correspondence c, there exist infinitely many n ∈ N and
corresponding ~pi ∈ Πn such that PrP∼~pi(|c(P )| = 2) = Ω(n−0.5). This proves the proposition.
13 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. LetM = (Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly positive and closed single-agent preference model,
where piuni ∈ CH(Π). For any voting correspondence c that satisfies anonymity and neutrality, let
rMPSR denote the voting rule obtained from c by MPSR-then-TB. For any n and any ~pi ∈ Πn, we
have:
PrP∼~pi(Sano(rMPSR, P ) + Sneu(rMPSR, P ) < 2) = O(n−
m!
4 )
Moreover, if TB satisfies anonymity (respectively, neutrality) then rMPSR also satisfies anonymity
(respectively, neutrality).
Proof. The upper bound is proved in the following two steps. First, we show that for any profile P
such that MPSR(P ) 6= ∅,
Sano(rMPSR, P ) + Sneu(rMPSR, P ) = 2 (15)
If |c(P )| = 1, then we have rMPSR(P ) = c(P ). (15) holds because c satisfies neutrality and
anonymity. If MPSR(P ) 6= ∅, then for any permutation σ over A, we have c(σ(P )) = σ(c(P ))
and it is not hard to see that MPSR(σ(P )) = σ(MPSR(P )). Let MPSR(P ) = V . There-
fore, rMPSR(σ(P )) is the alternative in σ(c(P )) that is ranked highest in σ(V ), which means that
rMPSR(σ(P )) = σ(rMPSR(P )). This means that Sneu(rMPSR, P ) = 1. For any profile P ′ with
Hist(P ′) = Hist(P ), it is not hard to see that MPSR(P ′) = MPSR(P ). Because c satisfies
anonymity, we have c(P ′) = c(P ). This means that Sano(rMPSR, P ) = 1.
Second, we show that PrP∼~θ(MPSR(P ) = ∅) = O(n−
m!
4 ) by applying the polynomial upper
bound in Lemma 1 in a way similar to the proof of Theorem 2. For any partitionQ = {Q1, . . . , QL}
of L(A), we define CQ as in Definition 4 based on AQ, which represents {xR − xR′ = 0 : ∀l ≤
L,∀R,R′ ∈ Ql}, and BQ = ∅. We have Rank(AQ) = m! − |Q|. Let C denote the set of all CQ,
where each set inQ contains at least two linear orders. It is not hard to verify that C characterizes all
P with MPSR(P ) = ∅, for any CQ ∈ C, SolQ 6= ∅ and Rank(AQ) ≥ m!2 , and |C| does not depend
on n. Because for any CQ ∈ C, piuni ∈ SolQ ∩CH(Π), we can apply the polynomial upper bound in
Lemma 1 to all CQ ∈ C, which gives us PrP∼~pi(MPSR(P ) = ∅) = O(n−m!4 ).
The “moreover” part follows after noticing that (1) for any pair of profiles P and P ′ such that
MPSR(P ) = ∅ and Hist(P ′) = Hist(P ), we have MPSR(P ′) = ∅, and (2) for any profile P with
MPSR(P ) = ∅ and any permutation σ over A, we have MPSR(σ(P )) = ∅.
14 Smoothed Likelihood of Other Commonly-Studied Events in Social
Choice
In this section we show how to apply Lemma 1 to obtain dichotomy results on smoothed likeli-
hood of various social choice events. Let us start with a dichotomy result on the non-existence of
Condorcet cycles.
Proposition 2 (Smoothed likelihood of non-existence of Condorcet cycles). Let M =
(Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly positive and closed single-agent preference model.
Upper bound. For any n ∈ N and any ~pi ∈ Πn, we have:
Pr
P∼~pi
(SNCC(P ) = 1) =
{
O(1) if ∃pi ∈ CH(Π) s.t. UMG(pi) is acyclic
exp(−Ω(n)) otherwise .
Tightness of the upper bound. There exist infinitely many n ∈ N such that:
max
~pi∈ΠN
Pr
P∼~pi
(SNCC(P ) = 1) =
{
Ω(1) if ∃pi ∈ CH(Π) s.t. UMG(pi) is acyclic
exp(−O(n)) otherwise .
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Proof. The proof proceeds in the following three steps.
First step: defining C. Let C denote the set of all CG where G is an acyclic unweighted directed
graph, as in Definition 11. We have the following observations. (1) For any profile P , SNCC(P ) = 1
if and only if Hist(P ) ∈ ⋃CG∈C SolG. To see this, if SNCC(P ) = 1 then UMG(P ) is acyclic, which
means that Hist(P ) ∈ SolUMG(P ), where CUMG(P ) ∈ C; and conversely, if Hist(P ) ∈ SolG for an
acyclic graph G, then SNCC(P ) = 1. (2) For any graph G, SolG 6= ∅ by McGarvey’s theorem. (3)
|C| only depends on m, which means that |C| can be seen as a constant that does not depend on n.
Second step, the O(1) case. The O(1) upper bound is straightforward. To prove its tightness,
suppose there exists pi ∈ CH(Π) such that UMG(pi) is acyclic. This means that there exists a topo-
logical ordering of UMG(pi). Let G denote an arbitrary complete acyclic supergraph of UMG(pi).
It follows that CG ∈ C, and pi ∈ SolG due to Claim 5. Therefore, CG ∩ CH(Π) 6= ∅. Also note that
AG = ∅, which means that Rank(AG) = 0. The tightness follows after applying the tightness of
the polynomial part in Lemma 1 to CG.
Third step, the exponential case. For any CG ∈ C and any pi ∈ CH(Π), we first show that
SolG ∩ CH(Π) = ∅. Suppose for the sake of contradiction there exists an acyclic graph G such that
pi ∈ SolG ∩ CH(Π). Then, by Claim 5, UMG(pi) is a subgraph of G, which means that UMG(pi)
is acyclic. This contradicts the assumption on CH(Π) in the exponential case. The upper bound
(respectively, its tightness) follows after applying the exponential upper bound (respectively, its
tightness) in Lemma 1 to all CG ∈ C (respectively, an arbitrary CG ∈ C).
The exponential case of Proposition 2 is exactly the very strong smoothed paradox part of Theo-
rem 1, because EP∼~piSNCC(P ) = PrP∼~pi(SNCC(P ) = 1).
The dichotomy results in this section will be presented by the following template exemplified by
Proposition 2. In the template, we will specify three components: (1) EVENT, which is an event
of interest that depends on the profile P . (2) CONDITION, which is often about the existence of
pi ∈ CH(Π) that satisfies a weaker version of EVENT, and (3) a number lΠ that depends on the
statistical modelM.
Template for dichotomy results (Smoothed likelihood of EVENT). LetM = (Θ,L(A),Π) be a
strictly positive and closed single-agent preference model.
Upper bound. For any n ∈ N and any ~pi ∈ Πn, we have:
Pr
P∼~pi
(EVENT) =
{
O(n−
lΠ
2 ) if CONDITION holds
exp(−Ω(n)) otherwise .
Tightness of the upper bound. There exist infinitely many n ∈ N such that:
max
~pi∈ΠN
Pr
P∼~pi
(EVENT) =
{
Ω(n−
lΠ
2 ) if CONDITION holds
exp(−O(n)) otherwise .
For example, in Proposition 2, EVENT is “there is no Condorcet cycle”, CONDITION is “there exists
pi ∈ CH(Π) such that UMG(pi) is acyclic”, and lΠ = 0. Table 4 summarizes the dichotomy results
using the template. A Condorcet winner is the alternative who beats every other alternative in their
head-to-head competition. If a Condorcet winner exists, then it must be unique. A weak Condorcet
winner is an alternative who never loses in head-to-head competitions. Weak Condorcet winners
may not be unique.
Any dichotomy result using the template is quite general, because it applies to all strictly positive and
closed single-agent preference models, any n, and any combination of distributions. In particular,
it is not hard to verify that if piuni ∈ CH(Π), where piuni is the uniform distribution over L(A), then
CONDITION is satisfied for all propositions in Table 4, which means that the polynomial bounds
apply. For example, because piuni ∈ CH(Π) for any neutral model (for any pi ∈ Π, the average of m!
distributions obtained from pi by applying all permutations is piuni), we have the following corollary.
Corrollary 2. The polynomial bounds in Table 4 apply to all neutral, strictly positive, and closed
models includingMA andM[,1]Pl for all 0 <  ≤ 1, and IC, which corresponds to Π = {piuni}.
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Table 4: Summary of dichotomy results on smoothed likelihood of events. CH(Π) is the convex hull
of Π. UMG is the unweighted majority graph.
Prop. EVENT CONDITION lΠ
2 No Condorcet cycles ∃pi ∈ CH(Π) s.t. UMG(pi) is acyclic 0
3
∃ Condorcet cycle of
length k
∃pi ∈ CH(Π) s.t. UMG(pi) contains a weak
Condorcet cycle of length k 0
4 ∃ Condorcet winner ∃pi ∈ CH(Π) that has at least one weakCondorcet winner 0
5 No Condorcet winner ∃pi ∈ CH(Π) and a supergraph G of UMG(pi)that has no weak Condorcet winner 0 or 1
6 ∃ exactly k weak Con-dorcet winners
∃pi ∈ CH(Π) that contains at least k weak
Condorcet winners
k(k − 1)
2
7 No weak Condorcet win-ners
∃pi ∈ CH(Π) and a supergraph G of UMG(pi)
that has no weak Condorcet winner 0
In light of Corollary 2 and as a result of Proposition 3, the likelihood of Condorcet voting paradox
is asymptotically maximized under IC, among all i.i.d. distributions over L(A). This givens an
asymptotic answer to an open questions by Tsetlin et al. [49].
If EVENT is desirable, such as “Condorcet winner” or “No Condorcet cycles”, then a polynomial
(sometimes Θ(1)) smoothed likelihood is desirable; if EVENT is undesirable, such as “No Condorcet
winner” or “there exists a Condorcet cycle of length k”, then an exponential likelihood is desirable.
Overview of proof techniques. All propositions are proved by applying Lemma 1 in the following
three steps exemplified by the proof of Proposition 2. First, we define a set C of constraints CAB’s
such that (1) EVENT is characterized by
⋃
CAB∈C SolAB in the sense that EVENT holds for a profile
P if and only if Hist(P ) ∈ SolAB for some CAB ∈ C, (2) for each CAB ∈ C, SolAB 6= ∅, and (3)
|C| is a constant that does not depend on n (but may depend on m). Second, for the polynomial
bound, the upper bound is proved by applying the polynomial upper bound in Lemma 1 to all
(constant number of) CAB ∈ C. The tightness is proved by explicitly choosing CAB ∈ C, often as
a function of some pi ∈ CH(Π), so that pi ∈ SolAB, which implies SolAB ∩ CH(Π) 6= ∅, and then
applying the tightness of the polynomial bound in Lemma 1. Third, for the exponential bound,
we first prove that for any CAB ∈ C, SolAB ∩ CH(Π) = ∅. Then, the upper bound (respectively,
its tightness) is proved by applying the exponential bound (respectively, its tightness) in Lemma 1
to all CAB ∈ C (respectively, an arbitrary CAB ∈ C).
For any 3 ≤ k ≤ m, we let SCC=k(P ) = 1 (respectively, SWCC=k(P ) = 1) if there exists a
Condorcet cycle (respectively, weak Condorcet cycle) of length k in P ; otherwise SCC=k(P ) = 0
(respectively, SWCC=k(P ) = 0).
Proposition 3 (Smoothed likelihood of existence of Condorcet cycles with length k). LetM =
(Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly positive and closed single-agent preference model.
Upper bound. For any n ∈ N, any ~pi ∈ Πn, and any 3 ≤ k ≤ m, we have:
Pr
P∼~pi
(SCC=k(P )) =
{
O(1) if ∃pi ∈ CH(Π) s.t. SWCC=k(pi) = 1
exp(−Ω(n)) otherwise .
Tightness of the upper bound. For any 3 ≤ k ≤ m, there exist infinitely many n ∈ N such that:
max
~pi∈ΠN
Pr
P∼~pi
(SCC=k(P )) =
{
Ω(1) if ∃pi ∈ CH(Π) s.t. SWCC=k(pi) = 1
exp(−O(n)) otherwise .
Proof. First step, defining C. For any length-k cycle p = a1 → a2 → · · · → ak → a1 in A, we
define Cp, where Ap = ∅ and Bp represents the k constraints {Paira1,a2(~xA) > 0,Paira2,a3(~xA) >
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0, . . . ,Pairak,a1(~xA) > 0}. Let C denote all such Cp. We have the following observations. (1) For
any profile P , SCC=k(P ) = 1 if and only if Hist(P ) ∈
⋃
Cp∈C Solp. To see this, if SCC=k(P ) = 1
then there exists a length-k cycle p in UMG(P ), which means that Hist(P ) ∈ Solp, where Cp ∈ C;
and conversely, if Hist(P ) ∈ Solp for some length-k cycle p, then p is a length-k Condorcet cycle
in P , which means that SCC=k(P ) = 1. (2) by McGarvey’s theorem [34], for each Cp ∈ C, there
exists a profile P where p is a cycle in UMG(P ), which means that Solp 6= ∅. (3) The total number
of length-k cycles in A only depends on m and k, which means that |C| can be seen as a constant
that does not depend on n.
Second step, the polynomial case. The O(1) upper bound is straightforward. To prove the tight-
ness, suppose there exists pi ∈ CH(Π) with SWCC=k(pi) = 1. Let p denote an arbitrary length-k weak
Condorcet cycle in UMG(pi). It follows that Bp · (pi)> ≥ 0, which means that Solp ∩ CH(Π) 6= ∅,
because Ap = ∅. The tightness follows after applying the tightness of the polynomial lower bound
in Lemma 1 to Cp, where Rank(Ap) = 0.
Third step, the exponential case. For any Cp ∈ C and any pi ∈ CH(Π), we first prove that
Solp ∩ CH(Π) = ∅. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a length-k cycle p
such that pi ∈ Solp ∩ CH(Π). Then, because Bp · (pi)> ≥ 0, for any edge ai → ai+1 in p
we must have pi[ai, ai+1] − pi[ai+1, ai] ≥ 0, which means that p is a length-k weak Condorcet
cycle in UMG(pi), meaning that SWCC=k(pi) = 1. This contradicts the assumption on CH(Π) in the
exponential case. The upper bound (respectively, its tightness) follows after applying the exponential
bound (respectively, its tightness) in Lemma 1 to all (respectively, an arbitrary) Cp ∈ C.
Let SCW(P ) = 1 if P has a Condorcet winner; otherwise let SCW(P ) = 0.
Proposition 4 (Smoothed likelihood of existence of Condorcet winner). LetM = (Θ,L(A),Π)
be a strictly positive and closed single-agent preference model.
Upper bound. For any n ∈ N and any ~pi ∈ Πn, we have:
Pr
P∼~pi
(SCW(P ) = 1) =
{
O(1) if ∃pi ∈ CH(Π) s.t. WCW(pi) ≥ 1
exp(−Ω(n)) otherwise .
Tightness of the upper bound. There exist infinitely many n ∈ N such that:
max
~pi∈ΠN
Pr
P∼~pi
(SCW(P ) = 1) =
{
Ω(1) if ∃pi ∈ CH(Π) s.t. WCW(pi) ≥ 1
exp(−O(n)) otherwise .
Proof. First step: defining C. Let C = {CG : SCW(G) = 1}, that is, C contains all CG (Defini-
tion 11) where G contains a Condorcet winner. We have the following observations. (1) For any
profile P , SCW(P ) = 1 if and only if Hist(P ) ∈
⋃
CG∈C SolG. To see this, if SCW(P ) = 1 then
Hist(P ) ∈ SolUMG(P ) ∈ C, where CG ∈ C; and conversely, if Hist(P ) ∈ SolG for some CG ∈ C,
then P has a Condorcet winner. (2) For any G with SCW(G) = 1, SolG 6= ∅ due to McGarvey’s
theorem [34]. (3) |C| can be seen as a constant that does not depend on n.
Second step: the polynomial case. The O(1) upper bound trivially holds. To prove the tightness,
suppose there exits pi ∈ CH(Π) such that WCW(pi) ≥ 1. Let a denote an arbitrary weak Condorcet
winner in UMG(pi). We obtain a complete graph G∗ from UMG(pi) by adding a → b for all tied
pairs (a, b) in UMG(pi), and then adding arbitrary edges between other tied pairs in UMG(pi). It
follows that SCW(G∗) = 1 and AG∗ = ∅ because G∗ is complete, which means that Rank(AG∗) =
0. The tightness follows after applying the tightness of the polynomial bound in Lemma 1 to CG∗ .
Third step: the exponential case. For any CG ∈ C and any pi ∈ CH(Π), we now prove that
SolG ∩ CH(Π) = ∅. Suppose for the sake of contradiction there exist CG ∈ C and pi ∈ SolG ∩
CH(Π). By Claim 5, UMG(pi) is a subgraph of G, which means that the Condorcet winner in G is
a weak Condorcet winner in UMG(pi), which contradicts the assumption that WCW(pi) = 0 in the
exponential case. The upper bound (respectively, its tightness) follows after applying the exponential
bound (respectively, its tightness) in Lemma 1 to all (respectively, an arbitrary) CG ∈ C.
Proposition 5 (Smoothed likelihood of non-existence of Condorcet winner). Let M =
(Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly positive and closed single-agent preference model. Let GΠ denote the
set of all unweighted directed graphs G over A such that (1) there exists pi ∈ CH(Π) such that
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UMG(pi) ⊆ G, and (2) SCW(G) = 0. When GΠ 6= ∅, we let lΠ = minG∈G Ties(G), where Ties(G)
denote the number of unordered pairs that are tied in G.
Upper bound. For any n ∈ N and any ~pi ∈ Πn, we have:
Pr
P∼~pi
(SCW(P ) = 0) =
{
O(n−
lΠ
2 ) if GΠ 6= ∅
exp(−Ω(n)) otherwise .
Tightness of the upper bound. There exist infinitely many n ∈ N such that:
max
~pi∈ΠN
Pr
P∼~pi
(SCW(P ) = 0) =
{
Ω(n−
lΠ
2 ) if GΠ 6= ∅
exp(−O(n)) otherwise .
Proof. First step: defining C. Let C = {CG : SCW(G) = 0}, where CG is defined in Definition 11.
That is, C contains all CG where G does not contain a Condorcet winner. We have the following
observations. (1) For any profile P , SCW(P ) = 0 if and only if Hist(P ) ∈
⋃
CG∈C SolG. To see this,
if SCW(P ) = 0 then Hist(P ) ∈ SolUMG(P ), where CUMG(P ) ∈ C; and conversely, if Hist(P ) ∈ SolG
for some CG ∈ C, then P does not has a Condorcet winner. (2) For any G with SCW(G) = 0, we
have SolG 6= ∅ due to McGarvey’s theorem [34]. (3) |C| can be seen as a constant that does not
depend on n.
Second step: the polynomial case. To prove the upper bound, we note that for any G such that
(1) there is no Condorcet winner and (2) G is a supergraph of the UMG of some pi ∈ CH(Π), the
number of ties in G is at least lΠ, which means that Rank(AG) ≥ lΠ. Therefore, according to
observation (1) above, we have:
Pr
P∼~pi
(WCW(P ) = k) ≤
∑
G:CG∈C
Pr
P∼~pi
(Hist(P ) ∈ SolG) = O(n−
lΠ
2 )
The last part follows after applying the polynomial upper bound in Lemma 1 to all CG ∈ C and the
observation (3) above. In particular, for any graph G that is not a supergraph of the UMG of any
pi ∈ CH(Π), PrP∼~pi(Hist(P ) ∈ SolG) is exponentially small due to Claim 5 and the exponential
upper bound in Lemma 1 applied to CG.
To prove the tightness, let pi ∈ CH(Π) denote a distribution such that there exists a supergraph
G∗ ∈ GΠ of UMG(pi) where G∗ contains lΠ ties. By Claim 5, pi ∈ SolG∗ , which means that
SolG∗ ∩ CH(Π) 6= ∅. Also by Claim 5, Rank(AG∗) = lΠ. The tightness follows after applying the
polynomial tightness in Lemma 1 to CG∗ .
Third step: the exponential case. For any CG ∈ C and any pi ∈ CH(Π), we first prove that
SolG∩CH(Π) = ∅. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that such CG ∈ C and pi ∈ SolG∩CH(Π)
exist. It follows from Claim 5 that UMG(pi) is a subgraph of G, which means that G ∈ GΠ.
This contradicts the assumption that G = ∅. The upper bound (respectively, its tightness) follows
after applying the exponential bound (respectively, its tightness) in Lemma 1 to all (respectively, an
arbitrary) CG ∈ C.
The following claim implies that l in Proposition 5 can only be 0 or 1.
Claim 10. For any unweighted directed graph G over A that does not contain a Condorcet winner,
there exists a supergraph of G, denoted by G∗, such that G∗ does not contain a Condorcet winner,
and the number of ties in G∗ is no more than one. The upper bound of one is tight.
Proof. LetG∗ denote a supergraph ofGwithout a Condorcet winner and with the minimum number
of ties. If there is no tie in G∗ then the claim is proved. For any pair of tied alternatives a and b in
G∗, adding a → b to G∗ must lead to a Condorcet winner due to the minimality of G∗, and a must
be the Condorcet winner. This means that a beats all alternatives other than b in G∗. Similarly, b
beats all alternatives other than a in G∗. This means that {a, b} is the only tie in G∗ because if there
exists another tie {c, d}, then adding c → d to G∗ will not introduce a Condorcet winner, which
contradicts the minimality of G∗. Therefore, the number of ties in G∗ is upper bounded by 1. The
tightness of the upper bound is proved by letting G be a graph where a and b are the only weak
Condorcet winners.
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For any profile P , let WCW(P ) denote the number of weak Condorcet winners in P .
Proposition 6 (Smoothed likelihood of exactly k weak Condorcet winners). Let M =
(Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly positive and closed single-agent preference model.
Upper bound. For any n ∈ N, any 1 ≤ k ≤ m, and any ~pi ∈ Πn, we have:
Pr
P∼~pi
(WCW(P ) = k) =
{
O(n−
k(k−1)
4 ) if ∃pi ∈ CH(Π) s.t. WCW(pi) ≥ k
exp(−Ω(n)) otherwise .
Tightness of the upper bound. For any 1 ≤ k ≤ m, there exist infinitely many n ∈ N such that:
max
~pi∈ΠN
Pr
P∼~pi
(WCW(P ) = k) =
{
Ω(n−
k(k−1)
4 ) if ∃pi ∈ CH(Π) s.t. WCW(pi) ≥ k
exp(−O(n)) otherwise .
Proof. First step: defining C. Let C = {CG : WCW(G) = k}, where CG is defined in Defini-
tion 11. That is, C contains all CG where G has exactly k weak Condorcet winners. We have the
following observations. (1) For any profile P , WCW(P ) = k if and only if Hist(P ) ∈ ⋃CG∈C SolG.
To see this, if WCW(P ) = k then Hist(P ) ∈ SolUMG(P ), where UMG(P ) ∈ C; and conversely,
if Hist(P ) ∈ SolG, then G = UMG(P ) contains exactly k weak Condorcet winners, which means
that WCW(P ) = k. (2) by McGarvey’s theorem [34], for each CG ∈ C, there exists a profile P with
UMG(P ) = G, which means that SolG 6= ∅. (3) The total number of unweighted directed graphs
over A only depends on m, which means that |C| can be seen as a constant that does not depend on
n.
Second step: the polynomial case. To prove the upper bound, we note that for any G that
has exactly k weak Condorcet winners, the number of ties is at least k(k−1)2 , which means that
Rank(AG) ≥ k(k−1)2 . Therefore, according to observation (1) above, we have:
Pr
P∼~pi
(WCW(P ) = k) ≤
∑
G:CG∈C
Pr
P∼~pi
(Hist(P ) ∈ SolG) = O(n−
k(k−1)
4 )
The last part follows after applying the polynomial upper bound in Lemma 1 to all CG ∈ C and the
observation (3) above.
To prove the tightness, suppose there exists pi ∈ CH(Π) with WCW(pi) ≥ k. This means that
there exists a supergraph of UMG(pi) over A, denoted by G∗, that has exactly k weak Condorcet
winners, and there is an edge from any weak Condorcet winner to any other alternative. By Claim 5,
pi ∈ SolG∗ and Rank(AG∗) = k(k−1)2 . The tightness follows after applying the tightness of the
polynomial bound in Lemma 1 to CG∗ .
Third step: the exponential case. For any CG ∈ C and any pi ∈ CH(Π), we first prove that
SolG∩CH(Π) = ∅. Suppose for the sake of contradiction there exist CG ∈ C and pi ∈ SolG∩CH(Π).
It follows that UMG(pi) is a subgraph of G, which means that all weak Condorcet winners in G
must also be weak Condorcet winners in pi. Because there are k weak Condorcet winners in G, we
have WCW(pi) ≥ k, which is a contradiction. The lower (respectively, upper) bound follows after
applying Lemma 1 to an arbitrary (respectively, all) CG ∈ C.
Consider the special case where piuni ∈ CH(Π). Notice that all edge weights in piuni are 0, which
means that piuni satisfies all pairwise constraints Paira,b defined in Definition 10. Consequently, for
any A and B that only contain pairwise constraints, we have SolAB∩CH(Π) 6= ∅. This observation
leads to the following corollary of Proposition 6.
Corrollary 3. Let M = (Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly positive and closed single-agent preference
model, where piuni ∈ CH(Π). For any 1 ≤ k ≤ m, any n ∈ N, and any ~θ ∈ Πn, we have
PrP∼~θ(WCW(P ) = k) = O(n
− k(k−1)4 ). The bound is tight for infinitely many n ∈ N and corre-
sponding ~θ ∈ Πn.
When M is neutral, we have piuni ∈ CH(Π). This is because for any pi ∈ Π, the average of m!
distributions obtained from pi by applying all permutations is piuni. Therefore, Corollary 3 applies to
all neutral, strictly positive, and closed models includingMA andM[,1]Pl for all 0 <  ≤ 1.
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Proposition 7 (Smoothed likelihood of non-existence of weak Condorcet winners). Let M =
(Θ,L(A),Π) be a strictly positive and closed single-agent preference model.
Upper bound. For any n ∈ N and any ~pi ∈ Πn, we have:
Pr
P∼~pi
(WCW(P ) = 0) =
{
O(1) if ∃pi ∈ CH(Π) and G ⊇ UMG(pi) s.t. WCW(G) = 0
exp(−Ω(n)) otherwise .
Tightness of the upper bound. There exist infinitely many n ∈ N such that:
max
~pi∈ΠN
Pr
P∼~pi
(WCW(P ) = 0) =
{
Ω(1) if ∃pi ∈ CH(Π) and G ⊇ UMG(pi) s.t. WCW(G) = 0
exp(−O(n)) otherwise .
Proof. First step: defining C. Let C = {CG : WCW(G) = 0}, where CG is defined in Defini-
tion 11. That is, C contains all CG where G has no weak Condorcet winners. We have the following
observations. (1) For any profile P , WCW(P ) = 0 if and only if Hist(P ) ∈ ⋃CG∈C SolG. To
see this, if WCW(P ) = 0 then Hist(P ) ∈ SolUMG(P ), where UMG(P ) ∈ C; and conversely, if
Hist(P ) ∈ SolG, then G = UMG(P ) does not contain a weak Condorcet winner, which means that
WCW(P ) = 0. (2) SolG 6= ∅ due to McGarvey’s theorem [34]. (3) |C| can be seen as a constant
that does not depend on n.
Second step: the polynomial case. The upper bound trivially holds. To prove the tightness, suppose
there exit pi ∈ CH(Π) and a supergraph G of UMG(pi) that does not contain a Condorcet winner.
LetG∗ denote an arbitrary complete supergraph ofG. It follows thatG∗ is a supergraph of UMG(pi)
and G∗ does not contain a Condorcet winner, which means that CG∗ ∈ C. By Claim 5, pi ∈ SolG∗ ,
which means that SolG∗ ∩ CH(Π) 6= ∅. Note that AG∗ = ∅, which means that Rank(AG∗) = 0.
The tightness follows after applying the tightness of the polynomial bound in Lemma 1 to CG∗ .
Third step: the exponential case. For any CG ∈ C and any pi ∈ CH(Π), we first prove that
SolG ∩ CH(Π) = ∅. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exist CG ∈ C and pi ∈
SolG ∩ CH(Π), which means that WCW(G) = 0. By Claim 5, UMG(pi) is a subgraph of G, which
contradicts the assumption of the exponential case, that all supergraphs of UMG(pi) contains at least
one weak Condorcet winner. The upper bound (respectively, its tightness) follows after applying
the exponential bound (respectively, its tightness) in Lemma 1 to all (respectively, an arbitrary)
CG ∈ C.
15 Berry-Esseen Theorem
Theorem 4 (Berry-Esseen Theorem [16]). Let Y1, . . . , Yn be independent random variables where
for all j ≤ n, E(|Yj − E(Yj)|2) = σ2j > 0, and E(|Yj − E(Yj)|3) = ρj < ∞. Let Fn(x) denote
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
∑n
j=1 Yj√∑n
j=1 σ
2
j
and let Hist(x) denote the CDF of the
standard normal distribution. Let ψ0 = (
∑n
j=1 σ
2
j )
−3/2 ·∑nj=1 ρj . Then, there exists a constant C0
such that for all x ∈ R,
|Fn(x)− Hist(x)| ≤ C0ψ0
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